curi blog comments http://curi.us/comments/recent Explanations for the curious en-us Tew vs. Rucka curi Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
Tew made a video on humor and briefly, negatively mentioned Rucka:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJFp_bl9nVY

In part 2, Tew trashed Rucka for a few minutes:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg7M7_FPZ-o

Rucka replied:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLy5yfGgfgg

Tew made a third video and trashed Rucka more:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDhyhuNhs_0

Rucka replied again:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGtVACsluCI

I'm not much of a Rucka fan, and I see some major flaws in his music, but I basically side with him here. I think Tew is an unhappy person who is unreasonably lashing out (and dishonestly contradicting his own past statements). And it's pretty clearly personal because there are so many people who are worse than Rucka who Charles could be criticizing instead. E.g. the Jonas song *Sucker* (which I'm considering making a video about) is much worse and more offensive than the Rucka songs I tried, and it's also far more popular.

Tew said something I thought was notable. Basically he doesn't think good people exist, so it doesn't matter if he's taking actions that would alienate them, because they don't exist anyway. He's kinda like Mallory (when Roark first finds him and he's given up, doesn't show up to interview for the job, etc.). I sympathize with that, but Tew won't speak with me, so I can't help him. (I seriously considering hiring Tew as a philosophy tutor, or something like that, just to get him to speak to me. But I decided not to because I found that he doesn't take paid work seriously (even though he needs the money). He'd gotten a paid project to discussing MGTOW and handled it unprofessionally. Being paid wasn't enough to get him to fairly consider ideas he was already (ignorantly) hostile to.]]>
Wed, 19 Jun 2019 21:54:25 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12809 http://curi.us/comments/show/12809
curi Submit Podcast Questions Wed, 19 Jun 2019 10:57:27 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12808 http://curi.us/comments/show/12808 GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I bet I saw it and didn't register it because it was more advanced than what I was trying to work on.

--

I practiced doing the spin-jump-groundpound-roll slowly. I noticed some things while doing that that I didn't notice when I was trying to go faster.

Now I'm able to do it faster and more consistently. Just now I did 5 of them consecutively with no mistakes and relatively fast.

And I'm able to get the spin to register without actually doing a spin. I do this while I'm rolling from the last spin-jump-groundpound-roll.

PS. my controller broke a bit. the d-stick sometimes does things on it's own. the problem shows up the clearest when I'm using the springy things that stick out of a wall. nothing happens. I don't get launched as expected. so I bought new controllers and I also got the rubber grips for the joy sticks.]]>
Wed, 19 Jun 2019 10:03:08 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12807 http://curi.us/comments/show/12807
N Submit Podcast Questions
> If you want to look up a specific issue where there's some disagreement, I recommend the economic calculation debate. I disliked what Hayek said and thought it undermined Mises and didn't understand Mises. I thought Rothbard was far better. But I don't remember the details of what Hayek said enough for a podcast.

Thank you. I was under the impression Hayek was disagreeing more with Mises. I will look into the economic calculation debate.

> I'm not really clear on what the question is ...

I don't really understand to what degree Mises relies on a priori nor how he arrives at them.
Since Rand shows there is no a priori knowledge and Mises uses it for his epistemology I am a little confused. What does this entail for Austrian econ as a whole if the whole foundation stands on an a priori knowledge?
I find Austrian econ the best econ by far which make the best arguments on most, if not all, econ issues. But if the a priori foundation builds on some faulty premises I am keen to learn more about it.

I have listened to your podcast on *Austrian econ & Objectivism* ( https://curi.us/files/podcasts/austrian-economics-and-objectivism.mp3 ).]]>
Wed, 19 Jun 2019 02:49:07 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12806 http://curi.us/comments/show/12806
curi Submit Podcast Questions
He doesn't have one. He presented himself as a Mises ally.

If you want to look up a specific issue where there's some disagreement, I recommend the economic calculation debate. I disliked what Hayek said and thought it undermined Mises and didn't understand Mises. I thought Rothbard was far better. But I don't remember the details of what Hayek said enough for a podcast.

> What is Mises' a priori position in his economical theory

He tries to argue economics stuff using arguments that don't depend on observations or experience (or value judgments). They are meant to be necessary truths like deductive logic or math. I'm not really clear on what the question is, but look at the table of contents and index of *Human Action* to find his explanations.]]>
Wed, 19 Jun 2019 02:01:18 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12805 http://curi.us/comments/show/12805
N Submit Podcast Questions 1) What is Mises' a priori position in his economical theory, 2) what is Hayek's critique of Mises in general, and 3) why is Hayek wrong on this?]]> Wed, 19 Jun 2019 00:06:04 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12804 http://curi.us/comments/show/12804 Dagny Open Thread Tue, 18 Jun 2019 23:49:33 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12803 http://curi.us/comments/show/12803 N Open Thread
> E.g. do you think Friedman knew he was mistaken about the negative income tax, and that it was bad, as Hazlitt explains in chapter 12 here?

If Friedman ever read Hazlitt's refutation of NIT (negative income tax), which I'm sure he did, he certainly had no answers to it - else he would have written his own refutation of Hazlitt. (If he has done that I am unaware of it.)

That leaves me to believe Friedman wanted political power / influence more than being correct in principle / being honest and lacking the integrity of Hazlitt who corrected his mistake on the matter as described in the chapter you mention (chapter 12, https://mises.org/library/man-vs-welfare-state-0 ).

> Would Friedman somehow advocate that anyway, while fully understanding everything wrong with it that Hazlitt lays out? Knowing it's just going to make things worse, as Hazlitt explains, why would he consider it practical or pragmatic? I think he disagreed with Hazlitt and wouldn't seriously engage in the pursuit of truth about the matter.

I think Friedman usually addressed issues where he disagreed with his critics and believed he was right. Here for some reason Friedman seemed to just evade the critique.
Thus this leaves me to believe he advocated a "less bad" system over a really bad one (despite knowing it was not the best available solution) since it was still close enough for the political elite to consider implementering it (even though it being wrong - perhaps he took a page from Keynes book regarding the long run ...).
This leads me to arguing pragmatism might be the underlying cause in Friedman's case.

> And here is Hayek sharing his perspective in an interview after Mises was dead: ...

> You can see the social metaphysics and the lack of understanding that Mises was right and why. Hayek was already indoctrinated with mainstream academia crap before he found Mises. And it's specifically Mises' arguments and reasoning that he questions and doubts.

Agreed. I'm starting to understand Rand's position on Hayek.]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 23:45:17 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12802 http://curi.us/comments/show/12802
Anonymous Open Discussion Tue, 18 Jun 2019 22:27:09 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12801 http://curi.us/comments/show/12801 Post something every day Frisco Open Discussion Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:55:10 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12800 http://curi.us/comments/show/12800 curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
You're maybe using the word "supports" here to mean something like "is a premise of". That is different than how the term is used in induction. Let's not reuse the same term with a different meaning. That will be confusing. Can we call it something else, e.g. logical implication? Or is it somehow different than logical implication?

I take it that "Therefore all small animals have eyes or (Stalin was God and Mao was his prophet)." is equally (100%) "supported", the same as (3). Right? (The parentheses are to clarify order of operations.)

How would deduction lead to something being 30% "supported"?

If a premise is "There is a 30% chance that X is true" then the implication "2+2=5 or there is a 30% chance that X is true" is 100% implied ("supported"), right? Given the truth of the premises (and given, as always, the truth of our view of deduction, and that we didn't make an analysis error) it's true, just like with any other syllogism.

You are using the word "probable" but you aren't referring to physical probability of events, e.g. dice rolls. Are you using it metaphorically, imprecisely, or what? Where are the details of its meaning? (It would help if you introduced as few additional, complex topics as you can.)

If something is the conclusion of multiple syllogisms, is it more "supported", or the same? Does something just have to be the conclusion of one syllogism to get 100% support? What if the negation of something is the conclusion of a syllogism, does that matter?

Which system of deductive logic is used for this? (And does it cover the issue of probability that you brought up?)

*But I shouldn't have to be asking these questions. Where is this written down?* Can you answer me using quotes instead of by writing ad hoc material? These strike me as basic questions. If the system you're advocating has been developed by anyone, I would expect them to be clearly addressed. Do you think that's unreasonable? Did Peirce answer all these questions? Previously you indicated you weren't advocating a new view, but maybe you'll want to revise that claim now, idk.

> The context is the large random sample of tests of this drug.

That is not an adequate specification of the context. You are leaving out e.g. what the drugs do, how, and the differences in design between the two drugs being considered. You are leaving out even a condensed summary of such matters as would routinely be provided to a patient IRL.

> I think we use many drugs today with little knowledge of how they work. Knowledge of their success in a vast number of use cases does a lot to overcome this uncertainty.

Little or limited knowledge is categorically different than *zero* knowledge. You're dramatically changing the topic. What's going on?]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 18:59:31 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12799 http://curi.us/comments/show/12799
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
1) All small animals have eyes
2) Marsupials are small animals
3) Therefore, all marsupials have eyes.

If the the existing knowledge was only probable 'most families of small animals have eyes', then our deduction only lets us conclude that 'animals under the marsupial family most likely have eyes'. Here it is deduced from our existing knowledge that we have more than an even chance of being right.

>Anything is input, but that input is not useful with literally zero context.

The context is the large random sample of tests of this drug.

I think we use many drugs today with little knowledge of how they work. Knowledge of their success in a vast number of use cases does a lot to overcome this uncertainty.]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 17:59:06 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12798 http://curi.us/comments/show/12798
Dagny Open Thread
E.g. do you think Friedman knew he was mistaken about the negative income tax, and that it was bad, as Hazlitt explains in chapter 12 here?

https://mises.org/library/man-vs-welfare-state-0

Would Friedman somehow advocate that anyway, while fully understanding everything wrong with it that Hazlitt lays out? Knowing it's just going to make things worse, as Hazlitt explains, why would he consider it practical or pragmatic? I think he disagreed with Hazlitt and wouldn't seriously engage in the pursuit of truth about the matter.

And here is Hayek sharing his perspective in an interview after Mises was dead:

http://blog.mises.org/9657/the-ucla-interviews-with-friedrich-hayek/

> At first we all felt he [Mises] was frightfully exaggerating and even offensive in tone [in his 1920 economic calculation paper and 1922 Socialism book]. You see, he hurt all our deepest feelings, but gradually he won us around

and

> I was never quite convinced by his [Mises'] arguments.... If I had come to him as a young student, I would probably have just swallowed his views completely. As it was, I came to him already with a degree. I had finished my elementary course; so I pushed him in a slightly more critical fashion. Being for ten years in close contact with a man with whose conclusions on the whole you agree but whose arguments were not always perfectly convincing to you, was a great stimulus.

You can see the social metaphysics and the lack of understanding that Mises was right and why. Hayek was already indoctrinated with mainstream academia crap before he found Mises. And it's specifically Mises' arguments and reasoning that he questions and doubts.

You can also read their books, see the confusions and crap, and realize they are not wise.]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 16:55:47 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12797 http://curi.us/comments/show/12797
Anonymous Open Thread
Mening they (MF & FH) understood that Mises had the better arguments, but fearing losing all political influence they compromised (lacking the integrity Mises had).]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 14:47:21 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12796 http://curi.us/comments/show/12796
curi Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VDItPddFYA

He thinks the key issue is that (without loss of generality) Facebook's owners have property rights and should be regulated less, not more.

The actual key issue is that Facebook has committed *massive fraud*. We don't need more or many regulations, but we do need to enforce the most basic rule of law. Facebook has lied, over and over, about its privacy policies, its free speech and moderation policies, what kind of platform it is, etc. It used these lies, these false advertisings, to defraud users and get bigger than it could have honestly.

Can Facebook have a terms of service and an acceptable use policy and so on? Yes. But that isn't what they are doing. Their ToS is *a pack of lies* which they don't actually follow. The ToS is false advertising about what their policies are. It's a fraud.

So the argument that Zuck built a company and has property rights, and is just an innocent victim of (potential) govt force ... not if he built his company by using fraud. Zuck is a force initiator who lies to users about what they are signing up for and what he's offering them.]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 14:01:13 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12795 http://curi.us/comments/show/12795
Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLy5yfGgfgg

The video is well done. It shows things Tew said in the past and things said recently.]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 12:33:25 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12794 http://curi.us/comments/show/12794
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
You're saying that ideas support ideas? How? Which ideas support which other ideas, and how much? Is there a formula or any clear guidelines, or is this done by intuition and "I know it when I see it"

This gets into many of the same issues I brought up previously. Your answer before was to filter out most ideas at an earlier step, but now we're at the earliest step so you'll have to deal with infinite classes of possible ideas.

> Would you consider the use of statistical confidence intervals/levels found from a random sampling of the drugs use on the population as input into your decision?

Anything is input, but that input is not useful with literally zero context. Statistics and numbers don't mean anything with no context in which to interpret them.]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 12:22:15 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12793 http://curi.us/comments/show/12793
Dagny Open Thread Tue, 18 Jun 2019 12:03:54 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12792 http://curi.us/comments/show/12792 Anonymous Alan Discussion Tue, 18 Jun 2019 10:35:37 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12791 http://curi.us/comments/show/12791 curi Open Discussion Tue, 18 Jun 2019 10:31:44 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12790 http://curi.us/comments/show/12790 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I think as a simplification for our discussion we can consider hypothesis as beginning with a random guess at what is true.

Once we have a guess, we then consider if it is worth taking seriously. We look at what our guess says about the world, and then we compare against what our existing theories (background knowledge) says about the world. If we find our guess can be deduced from our existing knowledge, then we may not even need to move onto the testing (inductive) stage.

We may only find our guess gets partial support, or is rendered only probable, but not necessary, by our existing knowledge. In this case, if we find the benefits provided by our guess (if it were to turn out true) worth our time, we may move onto the testing stage. Testing would focus on the new general claims provided by the theory; the claims whose grounds are most shaky.

If we find that our guess is in contradiction or poorly supported by our background theories, then we may cast it aside without any further consideration.

In regards to my medical example. Would you consider the use of statistical confidence intervals/levels found from a random sampling of the drugs use on the population as input into your decision?]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 02:18:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12789 http://curi.us/comments/show/12789
Anonymous Open Discussion Tue, 18 Jun 2019 01:37:37 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12788 http://curi.us/comments/show/12788 Anonymous Open Thread > Don't know what you're referring to with pragmatism.

I was referring to that they might believe that "what works better", in the prevailing political climate, is what to pursue instead of what is truly the best system (capitalism / laissez-faire).]]>
Tue, 18 Jun 2019 01:33:58 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12787 http://curi.us/comments/show/12787
Dagny Open Thread Mon, 17 Jun 2019 23:31:06 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12786 http://curi.us/comments/show/12786 Anonymous Open Thread > People like Milton Friedman, Hayek, and Ben Shapiro are considered right wing and pro capitalist and stuff, and they function as a sort of controlled, limited opposition that is actually sucking up to and legitimizing the bad guys, and undermining the actual good guys like Mises or David Horowitz.

Would you say it is pragmatism driving the former to do this (at least Friedman and Hayek) or was it something else (climbing the social ladder)?]]>
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 23:17:24 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12785 http://curi.us/comments/show/12785
Dagny Open Thread
And most people have been indoctrinated with a bunch of anti-capitalist propaganda. And they are bad at thinking and judge everything by slogans and popularity, not by truth. People are more interested in getting along with others than pursuing truth.

There is ongoing pressure against the holdouts. They get harassed, fired, ostracized, etc. People call them irredeemable racists. Evil has taken the initiative in this battle and hardly anyone is standing up to it. And many of the leaders on the side of Western civilization are actually traitors. E.g. Trump hasn't done what he was elected to do, and many other politicians have betrayed the voters in similar ways. But it's the traitorous intellectual leaders who do even more harm, overall. People like Milton Friedman, Hayek, and Ben Shapiro are considered right wing and pro capitalist and stuff, and they function as a sort of controlled, limited opposition that is actually sucking up to and legitimizing the bad guys, and undermining the actual good guys like Mises or David Horowitz.

I've taken your question as just sorta "what's wrong with the world?" cuz it's not specific to environmentalism or Marxism.

The most fundamental issue is we destroy children's minds. Children are hurt, over and over, until they obey. It ruins their ability to think well and turns them into second handers who are focused on social dynamics and pleasing other people. The rest is downstream consequences.]]>
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 13:06:55 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12784 http://curi.us/comments/show/12784
Anonymous Open Thread Mon, 17 Jun 2019 12:47:12 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12783 http://curi.us/comments/show/12783 Dagny Open Thread Mon, 17 Jun 2019 12:38:53 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12782 http://curi.us/comments/show/12782 Anonymous Open Thread
I have read *The Moral Case for Fossil Fuels*.]]>
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 12:31:17 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12781 http://curi.us/comments/show/12781
Anne B What To Read
I had been holding off on reading Popper and other philosophy until I get better at reading/thinking/learning. I think I'd misunderstand a lot of it if I read it now. But maybe it's still worth doing.]]>
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 08:55:56 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12780 http://curi.us/comments/show/12780
Anonymous Open Discussion
https://www.reddit.com/r/JordanPeterson/comments/c1ijfa/diversity_inclusion_macys_unconscious_bias/?utm_source=ifttt]]>
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 00:30:43 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12779 http://curi.us/comments/show/12779
curi What To Read
If ppl aren’t gonna read Popper/etc carefully they could at least read it quickly like i read scifi. The amount I've read in the last month – as a secondary activity after I do primary writing/research/etc – would make a good dent in the FI reading list.]]>
Sun, 16 Jun 2019 18:59:30 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12778 http://curi.us/comments/show/12778
Anonymous What To Read
I did not get a good impression reading the preview of *The Robber Barons: John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Cornelius Vanderbilt*. I did *not* get this book.

From the Rockefeller chapter (free sample).

> ... Cornelius Vanderbilt controlling the the monopoly on the waterways and Andrew Carnegie operating the steel monopoly, many wondered if there was another monopoly to be controlled in America.

> However, while the wealth of John [Rockefeller] was enough to warrant a second glance into the life of the industrialist, John found *his true love in dispersing the wealth* amassed during his lifetime.

>Trough the life of John D. Rockefeller, one can learn that there *truly is no greater joy than bestowing wealth to those not as fortunate* in the world.]]>
Sat, 15 Jun 2019 05:56:42 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12777 http://curi.us/comments/show/12777
Anonymous Politics Discussion
http://georgereismansblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-coming-green-terror.html]]>
Fri, 14 Jun 2019 22:39:07 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12776 http://curi.us/comments/show/12776
curi Race and IQ "Realism"
![](https://curi.us/img/66Du9zDDwlmJAZA-688x1227.png)]]>
Fri, 14 Jun 2019 21:55:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12775 http://curi.us/comments/show/12775
curi What To Read
It was not great. In a fair amount of ways it was similar to a Heinlein book. (And a typical, good one, not one of the weird ones.) But the sense of life was wrong, and I actually judged that the author is a bad person (even before the brief aside with a leftist political interpretation of the war on terror).

I'd be interested in discussing what's wrong with it with someone who had read it and also had read a lot of Heinlein.]]>
Fri, 14 Jun 2019 21:47:35 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12774 http://curi.us/comments/show/12774
curi Open Discussion
Channels include Project Veritas, Lauren Southern (though she claims she just retired ... right before [questions about her involvement with fraudsters could be asked](https://www.dangerous.com/50638/say-farewell-to-the-klepto-queens-of-the-british-far-right/)), Charles Tew, and various gaming related channels (leffen, PPMD, Mineral Overwatch, ml7 overwatch, and a bunch related to speedrunning).]]>
Fri, 14 Jun 2019 13:00:41 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12773 http://curi.us/comments/show/12773
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> we cannot perform an induction without a hypothesis to test.

From prior discussion, I understand the induction step to rely on certain limits on the hypothesis creation step. Not just any hypothesis can be created, only certain ones. There are some rules or restrictions because the induction step is unable to deal with certain ideas and they must be ruled out earlier. When I asked how induction dealt with some ideas, I found out they would have been dealt with previously. Can you give details of the goals and rules of the hypothesis stage? What is done in it and what is not done?

> Assuming your condition is life threatening, which option would you pick?

I'd read the literature. Even non-technical literature (magazine article, advice webpage, doctor's office info sheet, or instead of reading the doc could explain it to me) giving a basic overview of the choices and the upsides and downsides of each one would be so much better than nothing. Doctors always either tell me what to do or give me some info about my choices.

If you modified the scenario enough that I must decide immediately, I have brain damage and can't think much, I don't even know what part of my body needs the medicine, etc., then I would ask the doctor to decide for me (or, better, my trusted critical rationalist proxy who could read the literature). If I can't have info to make an informed decision myself, then the doctor (or my proxy) should use his expert judgment.]]>
Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:25:08 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12772 http://curi.us/comments/show/12772
Anonymous Open Discussion Fri, 14 Jun 2019 06:10:47 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12771 http://curi.us/comments/show/12771 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas > 1. Is prior to induction.
> 2. Is non-inductive.
> 3. Is required for induction. You can’t do induction separately without any hypothesis formation.

If the conclusion of an induction is the rational support/justification of a hypothesis, then yes we do require a hypothesis prior to our induction, and we cannot perform an induction without a hypothesis to test.

The hypothesis stage is non-inductive in the sense that it is not induction. Hypothetical inference often involves the conclusion of a new kind of fact, different to what can be found in its premises. This is unlike induction where the conclusion is usually support for a generalisation of its premises. However, as we trial solutions to a problem in our mind we will often rule them out (deductively) due to their contradictions with already accepted prior knowledge. If the reason this prior knowledge is accepted is due to support via induction, then induction does have an (indirect) role in the hypothesis formation stage.

> 4. Involves intelligent, creative reasoning, including both guesses *and* criticism.

Yes, I think this is a fine way of describing it.

> Even if (contrary to logic, but for the sake of argument) the explanations and context for both medicines were identical (so sample size is the *only* difference), I would *still* need to know what those explanations and context were in order to evaluate whether (and in what ways) the sample size difference matters.

Maybe I will try one last attempt at asking this question. Imagine the doctor offers you the red pill or the blue pill. He doesn’t know why they work, but he suspects in time they will come to understand. All he knows is that on a random sample of the population, the blue pill has worked 100% of the time (sample of 3 people), and the red pill has worked 99% of the time (sample of 100’000) people. He is willing to let you try one, and not the other. Assuming your condition is life threatening, which option would you pick?]]>
Fri, 14 Jun 2019 04:55:05 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12770 http://curi.us/comments/show/12770
curi What To Read Thu, 13 Jun 2019 22:17:43 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12769 http://curi.us/comments/show/12769 Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:07:39 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12768 http://curi.us/comments/show/12768 Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:03:24 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12767 http://curi.us/comments/show/12767 Anonymous Open Discussion
t.me/bant4chan]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 13:15:25 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12766 http://curi.us/comments/show/12766
curi Politics Discussion
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuX87JFzLFc

I wonder if any of it is coached by Veritas (or by anyone else), or how much he prepped, or whether he got the interview questions in advance.

[1] I don't like his goal of banning abortion, but I understand it some. I dislike the prochoice activists more. People on both sides are awful at science and reason. If you have no clue about science or reason, it makes sense to err on the side of caution.

I know that isn't the reason he'd endorse. He'd claim to know that life really does begin at conception or some religious nonsense along those lines.

But meanwhile the pro-choice activists know nothing about science and are totally sure of themselves, just like they are with everything else. And they shouldn't be. They are irrational fools pretending to be smart. They're dangerous. They are confident about abortion and evolution (where they happen to be right) and also about Marxism, white privilege, affirmative action, minimum wage, socialized medicine, immigration, global warming, paternalistic government, and so on (where they're wrong).]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 12:25:22 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12765 http://curi.us/comments/show/12765
Andy Andy Discussion
I do recall that I discussed the chapter some, and not having difficulty using the idea of a real abstraction. I don't recall the specifics of that discussion though.]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 11:39:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12764 http://curi.us/comments/show/12764
curi What To Read
You can find some quotes from the book (not posted by me) at http://curi.us/2189-open-discussion#c12443]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 10:34:04 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12763 http://curi.us/comments/show/12763
Anonymous What To Read
Re *The Myth of the Robber Barons*, use Voice Dream Reader or other Text To Speech.]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 10:26:42 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12762 http://curi.us/comments/show/12762
GISTE Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
> The second line of defense is self-defense. In most potentially violent situations, the police are not going to show up on time. It's up to you to e.g. run away or use a gun to protect your family. Police are more about punishing major crimes after the fact, and also thereby deterring crime. Sometimes they help with crimes in progress but they aren't very reliable for that. When Brook says if a Muslim does an honor killing, put him in jail, and he gives the impression that's a solution, he's neglecting that 99% of the time police catch and jail honor killers *after at least one person is already dead*.

he's also neglecting that it's common (in places like Saudi Arabia) for members of the family (often the women, like an aunt of the victim) to help the honor killers escape the law/police.

that kinda thing doesn't happen in America (or if it does, it only happens with people that have these bad values, people who immigrated here).]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 10:04:02 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12761 http://curi.us/comments/show/12761
Anonymous What To Read https://www.amazon.com/Robber-Barons-Rockefeller-Cornelius-Vanderbilt-ebook/dp/B07H1ML3RG

I was looking for *The Myth of the Robber Barons* in Audible, but they didn't have that one.
https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Robber-Barons-Business-America-ebook/dp/B004X2IJ72/?tag=curi04-20]]>
Thu, 13 Jun 2019 02:15:58 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12760 http://curi.us/comments/show/12760
curi What To Read Wed, 12 Jun 2019 21:05:48 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12759 http://curi.us/comments/show/12759 Anonymous Politics Discussion
being pro-life motivated the pinterest whistleblower. it helped him do something good]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 21:03:17 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12758 http://curi.us/comments/show/12758
Anonymous Andy Discussion
Have you ever tried to write down what you think that chapter says and found out if anyone else from FI agrees with your understanding?]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 20:58:11 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12757 http://curi.us/comments/show/12757
Andy Andy Discussion > Big outcomes generally come from many small outcomes combined. How can one fail to value the small outcomes individually, but value what they combine into? How can one value the sum but not the parts? There are ways, but I think there's confusion there and it's worth analyzing one's reasons.

I don't think it's a trivial issue. Yet I still think I did the right amount of analysis in my reply, though I now believe I failed to communicate that well.

I think my response was short because I assumed the single word "abstraction" would stand in for quite a lot of shared background knowledge without further explanation. That assumption now seems to have been mistaken so I'll explain it further.

Specifically, I had in mind the BoI chapter, "The Reality of Abstractions" when I wrote my reply.

So a more explicit explanation of my first sentence would be: I think of the sum for any complex goal as approximately a BoI real abstraction of its parts. I don't think of the sum as a mere arithmetic accumulation, as the word sum normally implies.

I also think my claim that the sum is a BoI real abstraction was an unusual / risky claim with significant implications. So I think it made sense to not go much further until hearing what curi or others might have to say about that claim.

If I'm correct to think of the sum as approximately a BoI real abstraction of its parts, I think that explains something important about how I can value the sum but not the parts, and what direction for further analysis might be helpful. Such as: when and what parts of an abstraction should one value and why?

On the other hand if I'm mistaken to think about the sum as a BoI real abstraction of its parts, I think there's little point in doing further analysis until that error is corrected and I'm thinking about it in some different way.]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:09:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12756 http://curi.us/comments/show/12756
curi How Comments Work Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:34:53 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12755 http://curi.us/comments/show/12755 curi Mario Odyssey Discussion
Not sure if you realized that. But yeah you should practice spinning and then doing the jump+groundpound+roll when there's no cutscene until you get used to it. It's not that hard IMO. If you find it hard, do it slower and correctly. Slow down until you find a speed you can press the buttons correctly at (even if it's too slow for mario to do the right thing). After you're doing the right buttons in the right order, speed up a bit, practice that a bit, speed up again, etc. You should never be screwing up a lot. If you are, that means you're trying to do it in a way that's too hard for you. Just practice it in an easier way (slower) a bit more until you can speed up further. It should be pretty easy to do it fairly fast so Mario is doing the right thing but you do jump into the air a bit. After practicing that a while, you should be able to gradually get the groundpound sooner after the jump. Then you can learn the timing for when to spin the joystick, and how much, during a cutscene like a race countdown.]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 13:00:07 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12754 http://curi.us/comments/show/12754
Anonymous Mario Odyssey Discussion
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4UKGbdMJCI]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:55:11 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12753 http://curi.us/comments/show/12753
Anonymous Politics Discussion Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:46:23 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12752 http://curi.us/comments/show/12752 Koch Brothers Team Up With George Soros, Patreon and Airbnb to Fight Online Extremism Anonymous Politics Discussion Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:13:29 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12751 http://curi.us/comments/show/12751 curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
OK, I think I understand. I thought induction had a starring role in your epistemology, but now I think it has only a secondary role. And I have no objection to you using deductive logic (narrowly and strictly considered) in any stage. But the hypothesis formation stage needs discussing before induction because your induction depends on it. I think it’s a positive and productive development that we’ve figured this out.

> I’m happy to accept the description of our hypotheses as “creative guesses”.

I don’t know what that means in adequate detail and it’s not a quote from earlier in this discussion. Do you believe that the hypothesis formation stage:

1. Is prior to induction.
2. Is non-inductive.
3. Is required for induction. You can’t do induction separately without any hypothesis formation.
4. Involves intelligent, creative reasoning, including both guesses *and* criticism.

? Short or yes/no answers are fine. I’m expecting “yes” to the first 3, but I want to be clear and check.

> I didn’t ask you to set aside all concepts and explanations. I wanted you to set aside all the *differences* between the two medical theories, except for the difference in their sample size.

Even if (contrary to logic, but for the sake of argument) the explanations and context for both medicines were identical (so sample size is the *only* difference), I would *still* need to know what those explanations and context were in order to evaluate whether (and in what ways) the sample size difference matters.

> If you can’t make a decision based on sample size alone, then just say so.

I did:

>> Sample size *alone* doesn’t tell you anything.

(PS: Please don’t use quotes again unless it’s a literal, exact quote.)

(PPS: I thought better of my one thing at a time discussion policy and replied to two separate things. I’ll try this policy: at most: one question, criticism or argument, and one short answer. That leaves room for half the discussion where you answer me, and half where I answer you. I think a larger number of shorter messages will be more effective, for the same word count, than a smaller number of longer messages. I’ll aim for shorter than this next time.)]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 11:47:11 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12750 http://curi.us/comments/show/12750
Anne B Anne Discussion
https://fsgworkinprogress.com/2011/05/17/orientation-by-daniel-orozco/

It has present tense, imperatives, and helping verbs, all of which I'd like to work on.]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:25:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12749 http://curi.us/comments/show/12749
Anne B Anne Discussion
I've learned to look things up when I'm unsure about them. I was not in the habit of doing that before.

I practiced doing post-mortems a little.

I've learned some things about grammar, although I may forget them.

Analyzing the simple sentences is getting easier. I don't hate it. It was sometimes frustrating or upsetting at first but now it isn't. But it is kind of boring.

I don't know how to decide when to move on. I could wait until I think I have an error rate of < 1%. I'm not there yet. Or I could move on to complex sentences now. I lean towards doing more simple sentences.]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 08:07:06 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12748 http://curi.us/comments/show/12748
Anonymous What To Read Regarding Berserk I think the manga as well as the -97 version (I have not seen the -16 version either) is interesting as it has the dynamics of tribalism and it's clashes with individualism (Guts, the protagonist).
One major theme in the manga is individualism, breaking with tradition ("destiny"), and taking charge of ones life. It's dialog heavy but also heavy on action. For those that like dark fantasy and manga I recommend it. Mind it it's ful of gore, so if you do not like that Berserk most likely is not for you. (By you I adress the reader, as Curi has already seen it.)]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 05:13:13 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12747 http://curi.us/comments/show/12747
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I'm happy to clarify that Popper used the word "whiff" and not "whiffs", but I'm not going to admit to your accusation that I was doubling down on misquoting Popper. If I was trying to quote Popper exactly, I would have looked up the text and given the full quote in the first place.

As I said, I misunderstood you as claiming that I was without a source. Instead you were just trying to point out that Popper said "whiff", not "whiffs". I incorrectly assumed you had a much bigger issue with what I had said.]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 02:19:21 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12746 http://curi.us/comments/show/12746
Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> Surely you can understand the possibility for misunderstanding here.

This comment implies, using social hints, that I'm being unreasonable. Some of the previous text hints, even less overtly, that I'm being unreasonable. That's your second time trying to attack me as a strategy to avoid correcting your own errors. That's typical irrational psychology.

Bye.]]>
Wed, 12 Jun 2019 00:14:39 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12745 http://curi.us/comments/show/12745
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
When you asked for the *exact quote* I misunderstood you. I thought you wanted to know whether I had any source for this claim. Hence why I replied with the source. I didn't realize you were really taking issue with the fact that I misquoted a *single word!* by *one character!*.

Surely you can understand the possibility for misunderstanding here.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 23:08:48 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12744 http://curi.us/comments/show/12744
curi What To Read Tue, 11 Jun 2019 22:07:00 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12743 http://curi.us/comments/show/12743 Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
You are in the wrong here but seem unable to admit it, and have also added an accusation against me. Being correct matters. You made a mistake. I'm perfectly happy to forgive a mistake, but not to accept a refusal to admit error in an especially clear case. The original mistake is, in my opinion, large enough to correct, but not very large. The second mistake (saying it was an exact quote after I asked) was larger but still not too awful. However, refusing to correct an error is, itself, a large and serious mistake, and totally contrary to the spirit of CR. If you can make no concession here, I will have to judge that you aren't worth talking to, because I would not be able to expect to persuade you of anything about epistemology, because that discussion/debate will be less clearcut/decisive than this.

PS Besides changing the inflection, you also removed Popper's scare quotes, so it was a misquote in two ways.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:55:56 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12742 http://curi.us/comments/show/12742
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I think you have overreacted somewhat.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:11:12 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12741 http://curi.us/comments/show/12741
Quoting curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas Tue, 11 Jun 2019 20:00:31 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12740 http://curi.us/comments/show/12740 Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> Yes, it's in "The Philosophy of Karl Popper Vol 2", in chapter "replies to my critics".

I checked that book, and others, before posting. You have misquoted it. I imagine you'll find this pedantic, but I think *exact* quotes are important to discussion, I think it really matters. It's especially problematic to do things like doubling down on the *exactness* of a misquote. It's worrying to compound error in a case where you ought to be changing your mind. Whether you agree with the general attitude or not, please, in this discussion, just don't use quotes unless you're fully confident that they're exact. FYI my attitude to quotes is the standard one at this forum; my opinion that quoting matters has been developed over the years in which I and others believe it did matter to many discussions.

> If my requirement is for our hypotheses to imply particular claim, and if your "most grass is green" does not meet this requirement, then it does not move onto the inductive stage. How do you deal with this theory in CR?

You haven't answered how you deal with it. It doesn't move on to the inductive stage, but how do you evaluate the idea, what do you do with it? Do you just ignore/reject all ideas that you can't deal with inductively?

CR deals with this theory the same way it deals with everything else: by conjectures and refutations. You come up with various ideas – that's not the important part, and this idea is fine – and then you use critical discussion to try to find flaws in the ideas. When you have a criticism of a flaw in the idea, you use it to improve your knowledge, either by changing the idea to a better idea (that doesn't have that flaw) or by rejecting the idea.

The CR method works just as well with empirical and non-empirical matters. (And as DD pointed out in FoR, even when we can do empirical tests, we deal with the majority of ideas without doing them.) Some criticisms mention observations and some don't, that's all. Using observations is a useful type of criticism and worth some study, but it's not different at the most fundamental level.

I had thought that you were familiar enough with CR to know this.

> You are claiming T2 is "more likely to be correct" because its claims have been adjusted for what was correct in the past. When it comes to future repeats of experiment E, what's to stop T1 from being correct and not T2?

I don't disconnect the future and the past. I connect them (in some cases and not others – as a matter of logic, the future always resembles the past in some ways while differing in other ways) by non-inductivist means. But my view (CR) is another matter. That's a topic change.

I was trying to make a point within your framework, using your premises, not using CR premises. Don't you think that T2 is the better theory than T1, by your own standards and in your view? Or do you want to deny that (on what grounds that you believe)? I was trying to make sense of how you compare theories, both to get information about it and to point out problems.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 19:21:26 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12739 http://curi.us/comments/show/12739
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Yes, it's in "The Philosophy of Karl Popper Vol 2", in chapter "replies to my critics".


> So your idea of induction doesn't deal with "Most grass is green."? So you have something else, something non-inductive, to deal with it? What?

If my requirement is for our hypotheses to imply particular claim, and if your "most grass is green" does not meet this requirement, then it does not move onto the inductive stage. How do you deal with this theory in CR?


>> This is not true. If your corrected theory is only corrected in those predictions that we got wrong, then it can do no better or worse than the original theory on new predictions. If you change it in more ways than this, then either theory could outperform the other.

> We do a science experiment, E, with controlled circumstances and get a result, R2. E is also done by several other labs with the same result, and no one has any criticism of the result. We accept the result. R2 refutes a theory, T1, which predicted R1. So we form a variant theory, T2, which has the same claims as T1 except that, in the case of E being done again, it predicts R2 not R1. What's the (directly relevant to the quoted context) problem?

You are claiming T2 is "more likely to be correct" because its claims have been adjusted for what was correct in the past. When it comes to future repeats of experiment E, what's to stop T1 from being correct and not T2?

Your claim that T2 is more likely to be correct because of its success in the past is an inductive argument.

There is only a problem here if you reject induction.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:54:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12738 http://curi.us/comments/show/12738
Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
At the time that you wrote this, did you know a source where Popper said this *exact* quote? If so, please share. If not, you shouldn't present it as a quote from Popper.

> To perform an induction I assume we have a hypothesis to test. A hypothesis that allows us to deduce predictions about the world.

So your idea of induction doesn't deal with "Most grass is green."? So you have something else, something non-inductive, to deal with it? What?

>>>> all you really said is: prefer theories where counter-examples are rarer to ones where counter-examples are more common. This is pointless because it's better to use theories with no known counter examples. It also can't be done without using premises which go beyond the traditional premises of induction. Adding additional premises to your theory of induction is an important change that merits carefully listing all of them and analyzing them.

>> To begin with, consider a variant theory which takes the original theory and adds exceptions for all known counter-examples. This is more likely to be correct (setting aside the issue that the difference is infinitesimal) because it's equally likely to be correct in all the other cases, plus it's correct instead of incorrect regarding the counter examples. The point is that we always have easy access to a theory that is *strictly better* (in terms of matching our observations), so there's no reason to ever use a theory with any known counter examples if our goal is empirical correctness (which is a goal you've been advocating).

> This is not true. If your corrected theory is only corrected in those predictions that we got wrong, then it can do no better or worse than the original theory on new predictions. If you change it in more ways than this, then either theory could outperform the other.

We do a science experiment, E, with controlled circumstances and get a result, R2. E is also done by several other labs with the same result, and no one has any criticism of the result. We accept the result. R2 refutes a theory, T1, which predicted R1. So we form a variant theory, T2, which has the same claims as T1 except that, in the case of E being done again, it predicts R2 not R1. What's the (directly relevant to the quoted context) problem?]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:24:07 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12737 http://curi.us/comments/show/12737
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
The class of things is fixed by the hypothesis. In order to perform our induction we require a hypothesis that we can derive particular claims from. It’s the same requirement for falsifying a hypothesis. I’m happy to accept the description of our hypotheses as “creative guesses”.

> Then you need to give the full details of this prior stage, including a full specification of all things it rules out and why (or give the methods of determining what is ruled out). Further, since this stage is *prior to induction*, it must be governed by a *non inductivist epistemology*. So that’s a very notable concession coming from an inductivist. It concedes that there is a way of thinking which is effective at least for some important things, which goes well beyond deductive logic, and which doesn’t involve induction.

As I said before, there are three stages in Peirce’s scientific method corresponding to his three types of inference; hypothesis (abduction), deduction, and induction. When did I ever say the scientific method is entirely inductive?

You are asking for a full specification of all the rules involved in the hypothesis stage, but we are supposed to be discussing induction instead.

You can think of my view as similar to Popper where we both accept abductive (hypothesis) and deductive reasoning. The difference is that I do not reject inductive reasoning.

> This is part of a pattern where you (and most inductivists do this) start making common sense arguments. That is impermissible in a discussion of first principles, of how the beginnings of thought/reasoning work. The first problem of epistemology is to understand how reason works, which, to avoid circularity, must be done without using reasonable thinking as a tool (you can’t presuppose the thing you’re explaining).

I’ll try to provide more details on what I mean by support. Every successful prediction made by a theory counts as a reason in its favour. Unsuccessful predictions count as reasons against it. Reasons compel our beliefs and action. The ratio of favourable to unfavourable cases can be considered as the chance of the theory being true. Peirce says:
>>Probability and chance undoubtedly belong primarily to consequences, and are relative to premises; but we may, nevertheless, speak of the chance of an event absolutely, meaning by that the chance of the combination of all arguments in reference to it which exist for us in the given state of our knowledge. Taken in this sense it is incontestable that the chance of an event has an intimate connection with the degree of our belief in it. Belief is certainly something more than a mere feeling; yet there is a feeling of believing, and this feeling does and ought to vary with the chance of the thing believed, as deduced from all the arguments. Any quantity which varies with the chance might, therefore, it would seem, serve as a thermometer for the proper intensity of belief. Among all such quantities there is one which is peculiarly appropriate. When there is a very great chance, the feeling of belief ought to be very intense. Absolute certainty, or an infinite chance, can never be attained by mortals, and this may be represented appropriately by an infinite belief. As the chance diminishes the feeling of believing should diminish, until an even chance is reached, where it should completely vanish and not incline either toward or away from the proposition. When the chance becomes less, then a contrary belief should spring up and should increase in intensity as the chance diminishes, and as the chance almost vanishes (which it can never quite do) the contrary belief should tend toward an infinite intensity. Now, there is one quantity which, more simply than any other, fulfills these conditions; it is the logarithm of the chance. But there is another consideration which must, if admitted, fix us to this choice for our thermometer. It is that our belief ought to be proportional to the weight of evidence, in this sense, that two arguments which are entirely independent, neither weakening nor strengthening each other, ought, when they concur, to produce a belief equal to the sum of the intensities of belief which either would produce separately. Now, we have seen that the chances of independent concurrent arguments are to be multiplied together to get the chance of their combination, and therefore the quantities which best express the intensities of belief should be such that they are to be added when the chances are multiplied in order to produce the quantity which corresponds to the combined chance. Now, the logarithm is the only quantity which fulfills this condition. There is a general law of sensibility, called Fechner's psychophysical law. It is that the intensity of any sensation is proportional to the logarithm of the external force which produces it. It is entirely in harmony with this law that the feeling of belief should be as the logarithm of the chance, this latter being the expression of the state of facts which produces the belief.

Peirce says the rule of induction is “that a number of facts obtained in a given way will in general more or less resemble other facts obtained in the same way”. The ways of collecting these facts that can be found to support our theory is fixed by our hypothesis. If we take a random sample of these facts and find that our theory is correct in 99% of cases, then depending on the sample size and our allowed confidence interval, we can determine how trustworthy our induction is (confidence level).

If we intentionally limited our testing (collecting of facts in a particular way) of products to those who were produced in one particular factory, then we lose confidence in our induction when inferring the same proportion of success in a different factory. However, we do not lose all confidence in our inference, because even an approximately random sample will often give us good results. If we intentionally limited ourselves to those facts that we know will confirm our theory, then we lose all confidence in our induction because it was manufactured to be a certain way. This is why a random sample is important for our induction.

> If you completely set aside all concepts and explanations, and you have only data, then *you know nothing.* Sample size *alone* doesn’t tell you anything.

I didn’t ask you to set aside all concepts and explanations. I wanted you to set aside all the *differences* between the two medical theories, except for the difference in their sample size.

If someone asks you to choose between two different things, informing you of their differences, then you should not answer the question by first assuming other differences between the things and then basing you answer on these other differences instead. If you can’t make a decision based on sample size alone, then just say so.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 17:57:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12736 http://curi.us/comments/show/12736
Anonymous Open Discussion
https://marco.org/2019/06/09/apple-is-listening]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 14:52:20 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12735 http://curi.us/comments/show/12735
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I stated why I gave those quotes and references. That was not the reason I stated.

> In the end Popper admitted "whiffs" of induction in his attempts to provide a working theory of corroboration/verisimilitude

Not in the end but *in the beginning*, in his early work, which he then improved on (and then DD and I improved on it further). Popper provided a complete epistemology even if you ignore corroboration.

> I'll reply to your other comment tomorrow.

ok]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 11:00:03 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12734 http://curi.us/comments/show/12734
Anonymous Andy Discussion
> I think the sum is an abstraction of its parts. The parts aren't (necessarily) valuable on their own; only as a complete whole do they become valuable.

You took that out of context and didn't give a serious reply to:

>> There are ways, but I think there's confusion there and it's worth analyzing one's reasons.

You didn't analyze. You seem to disagree that there's confusion there. You think it's a trivial issue (for you) to be covered in 2 sentences. So you are maybe claiming that *curi is mistaken*, but you didn't actually say that, or anything even close to that. If that's what you meant, you're being dishonest to refuse to say it. If you don't mean/think/claim that, your answer is bad.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 10:43:32 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12733 http://curi.us/comments/show/12733
Anonymous Anne Discussion Tue, 11 Jun 2019 10:39:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12732 http://curi.us/comments/show/12732 curi Alan Discussion Tue, 11 Jun 2019 10:38:52 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12731 http://curi.us/comments/show/12731 curi What To Read Tue, 11 Jun 2019 09:30:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12730 http://curi.us/comments/show/12730 GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I practiced the spin-jump-groundpound-roll a bunch, for 2 more sessions.

in the earlier session, I got lucky and did one of these very fast (it looked just like in the WR video). I got like zero height after the spin-jump-groundpound before I was able to get the roll to happen. I call it lucky because most of the time I failed to get it done at all, and for the remaining, I got it done but really slowly (where I get a lot of height from the jump before ground pounding).

in the latest session, I didn't get that lucky but I was more consistent in getting them to happen and on average i got them done quicker.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 07:43:11 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12729 http://curi.us/comments/show/12729
Anonymous What To Read Tue, 11 Jun 2019 07:27:37 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12728 http://curi.us/comments/show/12728 Anonymous Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
The section of Popper you quoted is part of his argument against the subjective theory of probability. He ends up claiming that the objective theory of probability is superior:
>>5. All these difficulties disappear as soon as we interpret our probabilities objectively.

Peirce does the exact same thing in the article I linked you "The Probability of Induction". He argues against the subjective theory and in favour of the objective theory. Summarised by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
>>Peirce vigorously attacked the subjectivist view of de Morgan and others to the effect that probability is merely a measure of our level of confidence or strength of belief. He allowed that the logarithm of the odds of an event might be used to assess the degree of rational belief that should be accorded to an event, but only provided that the odds of the event were determined by the objective relative frequency of the event. In other words, Peirce suggested that any justifiable use of subjectivism in connection with probability theory must ultimately rest on quantities obtained by means of an objectivist understanding of probability.

If you are suggesting that Popper has attempted to refute Peirce here, then I think you have misread Popper, or perhaps Popper misread Peirce.

Popper and Peirce actually seem to agree for the most part. Peirce anticipated Popper with his ideas of fallibilism, propensity probability, critical tests, etc. Their accounts of science are quite similar too where they both highlight steps of hypothesis and deduction. However, Peirce allows for positive support through induction as well. In the end Popper admitted "whiffs" of induction in his attempts to provide a working theory of corroboration/verisimilitude, so maybe their theories are similar here too.

I'll reply to your other comment tomorrow.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 06:17:41 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12727 http://curi.us/comments/show/12727
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
This is not true. If your corrected theory is only corrected in those predictions that we got wrong, then it can do no better or worse than the original theory on new predictions. If you change it in more ways than this, then either theory could outperform the other.

> Now that I've clarified, as you asked me to, please reply again to what I was saying.

To perform an induction I assume we have a hypothesis to test. A hypothesis that allows us to deduce predictions about the world.


> That is vague and basically meaningless/has-no-content. There is no set of observations we could make which would refute that alleged implication. The "most of the time" is a hedge that means it could fail to happen an unlimited number of times. Logical implications require extreme preciseness. If you don't want to be precise, don't make claims about logic.

Then you have provided a theory whose implications are vague and of little use to us. If we can't gather support for your theory through induction, then it doesn't get it.]]>
Tue, 11 Jun 2019 05:21:21 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12726 http://curi.us/comments/show/12726
curi What To Read Mon, 10 Jun 2019 22:13:09 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12725 http://curi.us/comments/show/12725 Anonymous Politics Discussion
![](https://i.imgur.com/naUWQu7.png)]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 17:06:18 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12724 http://curi.us/comments/show/12724
Anonymous Politics Discussion
![](https://i.imgur.com/JKSsihU.png)]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 17:04:40 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12723 http://curi.us/comments/show/12723
Anonymous Politics Discussion Mon, 10 Jun 2019 17:03:22 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12722 http://curi.us/comments/show/12722 Anonymous Politics Discussion Mon, 10 Jun 2019 17:00:46 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12721 http://curi.us/comments/show/12721 Peirce curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> Are you familiar with any of Peirce's work?

I haven't read much Peirce (Popper did – Peirce is one of the thinkers that Popper was addressing with CR, it’s not something CR overlooked), but I'm familiar with the ideas he's talking about. E.g. the first sentence of the link contains several standard inductivist errors:

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_12/April_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_IV

> WE have found that every argument derives its force from the general truth of the class of inferences to which it belongs; and that probability is the proportion of arguments carrying truth with them among those of any *genus*.

One of the crucial errors, which relates to what we've been talking about, is that every argument belongs to *infinitely many classes of inferences*, not one class. Failure to consider and deal with infinite sets/classes/etc is one of the typical themes of inductivist reasoning. I saw this immediately and I’m not saying anything original here. Peirce is walking right into CR arguments, rather than saying something they don’t apply to. (In his defense, he predates CR. But you’re trying to bring up his beliefs as something you think is correct today.)

Also, to discuss the “proportion of arguments” that are true from an infinite set requires defining a measure on that set (not all inference classes contain infinitely many arguments, but infinitely many of them do). Peirce doesn’t address that. After defining that measure, he would then need to address the fact that we can’t actually do that measurement, so we’d need an effective way to approximate it (and arguments/analysis to show that it is effective), which he doesn’t provide. This stuff is problematic even in finite cases because even if you have a list of every argument in the class you still may not know which arguments are true.

(Here is a semi-new issue which is different than most other inductivists.) His argument is actually similar to a circular argument because it says to judge the truth of arguments by the the truth of other arguments in the class. He has you judge arg1 based on the evaluations of arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, etc. But the evaluation of arg2 depends on the evaluation of arg1. The evaluation of every argument in the class depends on the evaluation of every other argument in the class, so how can you evaluate any of them?

If you believe Peirce correctly answers any of this, please give exact quotes as direct replies to specific arguments that I made.

---

I’ll give 2 quotes from LScD for examples of Popper speaking about Peirce (bold added):

> I now turn to the last group of epistemologists—those who do not pledge themselves in advance to any philosophical method, and who make use, in epistemology, of the analysis of scientific problems, theories, and procedures, and, most important, of scientific discussions. This group can claim, among its ancestors, almost all the great philosophers of the West. (It can claim even the ancestry of Berkeley despite the fact that he was, in an important sense, an enemy of the very idea of rational scientific knowledge, and that he feared its advance.) Its most important representatives during the last two hundred years were Kant, Whewell, Mill, **Peirce**, Duhem, Poincaré, Meyerson, Russell, and—at least in some of his phases—Whitehead. Most of those who belong to this group would agree that scientific knowledge is the result of the growth of common-sense knowledge. But all of them discovered that scientific knowledge can be more easily studied than common-sense knowledge. For it is common-sense knowledge writ large, as it were. Its very problems are enlargements of the problems of common-sense knowledge. For example, it replaces the Humean problem of 'reasonable belief' by the problem of the reasons for accepting or rejecting scientific theories. And since we possess many detailed reports of the discussions pertaining to the problem whether a theory such as Newton's or Maxwell's or Einstein's should be accepted or rejected, we may look at these discussions as if through a microscope that allows us to study in detail, and objectively, some of the more important problems of 'reasonable belief'.

and

> 4. I do not think that this paradox can be solved within the frame-work of the subjective theory, for the following reason.
>
> The *fundamental postulate of the subjective theory* is the postulate that degrees of the rationality of beliefs in the light of evidence exhibit a *linear order*: that they can be measured, like degrees of temperature, on a one-dimensional scale. But from **Peirce** to Good, all attempts to solve the problem of the weight of evidence within the framework of the subjective theory proceed by introducing, in addition to probability, *another measure of the rationality of belief in the light of evidence*. Whether this new measure is called 'another dimension of probability', or 'degree of reliability in the light of the evidence', or 'weight of evidence' is quite irrelevant. What is relevant is the (implicit) admission that it is not possible to attribute linear order to degrees of the rationality of beliefs in the light of the evidence: that there may be *more than one way in which evidence may affect the rationality of a belief*. This admission is sufficient to overthrow the fundamental postulate on which the subjective theory is based.
>
> Thus the naïve belief that there really are intrinsically different kinds of entities, some to be called, perhaps, 'degree of the rationality of belief' and others 'degree of reliability' or of 'evidential support', is no more able to rescue the subjective theory than the equally naïve belief that these various measures 'explicate' different '*explicanda*'; for the claim that there exists an '*explicandum*' here—such as 'degree of rational belief—capable of 'explication' in terms of probability stands or falls with what I have called the 'fundamental postulate'.

Peirce’s name also appears in other books, e.g. *on 90 separate pages* in [The philosophy of Karl Popper. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp](https://www.amazon.com/philosophy-Popper-Edited-Arthur-Schilpp/dp/B00RI9B0DW/). In that book, Popper explains some of his disagreements with Peirce. Peirce also comes up in C&R, OK and elsewhere.

I’m not asking you to understand or respond to these passages (quoted or not). I want you to know that CR already took into account Peirce. (And if CR did so incorrectly, some fan of Peirce, who is also familiar with Popper, ought to have written something pointing out CR’s errors.) Your view of the state of the debate, in which CR argues against other types of induction but not Peirce’s, is incorrect.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 16:16:26 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12720 http://curi.us/comments/show/12720
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Infer that it’s true of *which* whole class?

This is standard induction which fails to deal with standard CR reasoning.

**I particularly want an answer to this point.** Going forward (after this comment and the next one about Peirce), I plan to (actually!) reply to *only one thing at a time*, rather than continuing to write long explanations. If you want more long explanations, you can read and comment on CR materials, and focus on learning, and then I would expect to write more of them. But they’re making it difficult to resolve the points being debated.

> This is why I say your theory+exception type theories are not a problem for induction, because they are ruled out at the hypothesis stage instead.

Then you need to give the full details of this prior stage, including a full specification of all things it rules out and why (or give the methods of determining what is ruled out). Further, since this stage is *prior to induction*, it must be governed by a *non inductivist epistemology*. So that’s a very notable concession coming from an inductivist. It concedes that there is a way of thinking which is effective at least for some important things, which goes well beyond deductive logic, and which doesn’t involve induction. What are the limits of this epistemology and why do you advocate multiple epistemologies instead of just one? (An epistemology is a set of ideas saying how thinking/reasoning/learning work, which governs what conclusions are considered and accepted. Your epistemology as a whole has a sub-epistemology nested in its first stage. My belief is that this epistemology is either equivalent to CR or won’t work. Does there exist a text which is aware that it is trying to specify a pre-inductivist epistemology, for use in this stage of thinking that comes before induction, and which then explains in detail some CR rival?)

> The majority of these infinite logically possible theories make claims that have no support. In fact, there is strong support in opposition to the class of claims made by these theories. If you want to pose the theory that says my wallet will be transported to the moon in the next second then you are claiming a character for physical objects that has absolutely zero support. That not a single physical object has ever had this sort of character is too much to be overcome by such theories.

This is part of a pattern where you (and most inductivists do this) start making common sense arguments. That is impermissible in a discussion of first principles, of how the beginnings of thought/reasoning work. The first problem of epistemology is to understand how reason works, which, to avoid circularity, must be done without using reasonable thinking as a tool (you can’t presuppose the thing you’re explaining).

And so far you haven’t established any correct meaning of “support”, but now you’re using it in the standard way instead of continuing the part of the discussion where you try to detail and defend “support”. My #12700 gave several arguments regarding your approach to empirical support which you haven’t answered. In the meantime, while you haven’t answered all criticisms of support, please stop using your concept of support as a premise. It’s not productive to make arguments based on premises which are in dispute (that’s called begging the question).

You’re also trying to introduce a new evaluation procedure (without stopping and saying you’re going to do so, naming it, or otherwise giving it appropriate attention, just tossing it in without details) whereby some arguments, instead of being evaluated by proportion of empirical, logical implications that test correctly, are instead evaluated in some other way. This other way has not been specified in detail but seems to involve splitting ideas into parts (which ideas are split into which set of parts?), evaluating the incomplete parts separately, and then somehow combining the evaluations to reach an overall conclusion. You did mention this previously but didn’t give details then either. It’s all problematic and, I fear, ad hoc (rather than something that someone had worked out, thought was correct *after* he finished figuring out the details, and then published). I think the actual thing going on here is an epistemology prior to induction which must be used to do this claim splitting *according to creative and intelligent thought* (rather than according to predefined rules, math, non-AGI computer code, or any logical procedure). That prior epistemology is either CR or an unspecified rival to CR that doesn’t use induction.

> Testing randomly is very important in science

No tests are purely random. All tests are either 1) not random (those tests are very important, which was my point, because the view you were presenting only involved random testing); or 2) partially random, with the random and non-random aspects chosen by design (not chosen randomly. it’s always intelligent reasoning that’s guiding things, not random data). I was not denying the value of partially random tests *in addition to* non-random tests. I don’t think you’ve carefully considered in what ways partially random tests are and are not random, nor have you found any inductivist writer who has done so and explained it for you. Instead, you have a vague idea of random tests which isn’t logically rigorous and involves ideas like “If you have no reason to think your sample is biased in any particular way” which is presupposing some other non-inductivist epistemology (which governs reasoning and judging what we do and do not have reason for) prior to your treatment of induction. (It has to be prior to avoid circularity.) Also, random is a different thing than representative or unbiased.

> I was trying to keep it simple. I think you have complicated things by introducing “known important failure modes”. Don’t do that. Assume the only difference between the theories is that one has been tested far more than the other. The testing is random, and not biased towards any sort of failure modes, etc. I want to know if the size of the sample matters for you. To do so you need to consider it independently of other factors.

If you completely set aside all concepts and explanations, and you have only data, then *you know nothing.* Sample size *alone* doesn’t tell you anything. You have to e.g. check for systematic bias in the sample, which requires understanding what is being sampled and how (e.g. you need to check whether the judgments of success or failure are made in a reasonable way or not). What you’re talking about is the *explanationless science* that DD criticizes in BoI.

You assert things like that the testing is random and unbiased, but there is no way to know that without bringing in other factors like explanations. And what you actually mean is the testing is random in some ways but not others (rather than observing random things, you’re trying to observe whether a medicine works), and the reasoning for what to do randomly and nonrandomly, and how and why, is important. Sample size does matter in some ways, but not independently of other factors, you can’t get anywhere with no other factors involved.

Sample size, like observations in general, only matters *when there is an explanation/argument saying why it matters in this case*. It can’t be divorced from reasoning and still matter. Reasoning is necessary.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 16:11:16 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12719 http://curi.us/comments/show/12719
Anonymous Race and IQ "Realism" Mon, 10 Jun 2019 15:09:22 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12718 http://curi.us/comments/show/12718 Anonymous Race and IQ "Realism"
https://www.eurocanadian.ca/2019/01/are-east-asians-more-intelligent-than-whites.html

It doesn't say anything about Ashkenazi
If the Jews are really smarter they deserve to rule :D]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 14:55:08 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12717 http://curi.us/comments/show/12717
Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
To begin with, consider a variant theory which takes the original theory and adds exceptions for all known counter-examples. This is more likely to be correct (setting aside the issue that the difference is infinitesimal) because it's equally likely to be correct in all the other cases, plus it's correct instead of incorrect regarding the counter examples. The point is that we always have easy access to a theory that is *strictly better* (in terms of matching our observations), so there's no reason to ever use a theory with any known counter examples if our goal is empirical correctness (which is a goal you've been advocating).

Now that I've clarified, as you asked me to, please reply again to what I was saying.

> That's because your theory ["Most grass is green"] doesn't imply any particular predicted observations,

I know and said that. You're repeating what I said back to me. I don't know why. I brought it up in order to ask you a question, which you haven't answered.

> but it does imply that in any random sample of grass, the majority of it will be green, most of the time.

That is vague and basically meaningless/has-no-content. There is no set of observations we could make which would refute that alleged implication. The "most of the time" is a hedge that means it could fail to happen an unlimited number of times. Logical implications require extreme preciseness. If you don't want to be precise, don't make claims about logic.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 13:36:00 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12716 http://curi.us/comments/show/12716
Anonymous Politics Discussion
Total mess. I would *not* recommend reading the whole article. It's a bit repetitive, kinda disorganized, and very long. But I'd recommend reading/skimming a bit to get the idea if you were interested in some of these ppl.

https://www.dangerous.com/50638/say-farewell-to-the-klepto-queens-of-the-british-far-right/]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 10:54:23 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12715 http://curi.us/comments/show/12715
curi What To Read
I read 70% of *Time Enough for Love* which is weird. I don't like Heinlein's polygamy material in general and I'm not very interested in his views on genetics (which are old and have no criticisms or improvements to offer re my beliefs about genetics). I might not read the rest of the book.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 10:44:55 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12714 http://curi.us/comments/show/12714
curi What To Read
I think I've seen a few Goodkind quotes that didn't impress me either. If someone knows a few great quotes, please share it and maybe then I'll want to read more.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 10:39:56 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12713 http://curi.us/comments/show/12713
spin, ground pound, roll GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I can do this a bit better now. Much quicker. I don't get much height after the spin before getting the ground pound to happen. I also get the spin to happen more consistently.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 07:55:05 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12712 http://curi.us/comments/show/12712
Checking out a any% speed run GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
He does tons of things I don't know how to do (either at all or not well).

The first thing seems to be the spin, then ground pound, then roll.

I've never done it before. I'm able to do this now but it's slow. I do the spin and then ground pound, but it seems I'm doing the ground pound to slow because I end up getting a ton of height during the spin. The WR video shows the ground pound happening before he gets any or much height at all from the spin.

I tried a few more times and I can do it a bit faster now but it still seems way slower than the video. I still get some height from the spin before I do the ground pound.

I also don't seem to be getting a spin to happen fast. (I'm not new to the spin. I've used it some before and I've even tried to optimize my ability to get a spin to happen quickly/consistently.

[1] https://www.speedrun.com/smo/run/y6l7w56y]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 07:47:07 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12711 http://curi.us/comments/show/12711
Anonymous What To Read http://fantasybookcritic.blogspot.com/2007/12/interview-with-terry-goodkind.html

He writes fantasy. I have not read anything of his so I can't say if it is good or bad. Have you read anything of Goodkind?]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 07:22:37 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12710 http://curi.us/comments/show/12710
GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I tried this a bunch more times and finally got it right. Not sure what was different this time and I don't think I could do this consistently at all.

I messed up a bit later in the race but I still got a PR of under 28 seconds. The part I messed up on is where I launch from the springy thing to get on top of the plateau. I'm supposed to do a dive into the finish line rather than touching the plateau first and then moving to the finish line. I touched the plateau because I was too close to it when I launched from the springy thing.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 07:17:59 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12709 http://curi.us/comments/show/12709
optimizing seaside race GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I watched a previous WR video [1] and noticed another short cut. It seems the player starts out the race turning left and then throwing out Cappy (by shaking both controllers) to get the Cheep Cheep (before I was just swimming to the cheep cheep to get closer and then throwing out cappy to capture it).

I tried to do this but the Cheep Cheep is too far away. I watched the video again and noticed that the camera angle is moving too. So I tried starting out the race by using the left joystick to move 10 degrees to the right of left and using the right joystick to put the camera in the same direction, then throw out cappy. then when cappy is just under the Cheep Cheep, shake the controllers again to grab the Cheep Cheep.

but when I try this, cappy does not grab the Cheep Cheep. it seems my cappy is not close enough. I'm not sure what's going on. if I try to delay throwing out cappy until I've moved to the left a bit, it seems to take much longer than compared to what I see in the video.

[1] https://twitter.com/HamSam03/status/981775980548075520]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 07:10:11 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12708 http://curi.us/comments/show/12708
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Why do you prefer the use of theories with no known counter examples? Are they more likely to work than a theory that has a counter example?


>Also you said basically to logically derive predictions from theories. You can do that from "All grass is green" but you can't do it from e.g. "Most grass is green". You can't derive any particular predicted observations from that claim.

That's because your theory doesn't imply any particular predicted observations, but it does imply that in any random sample of grass, the majority of it will be green, most of the time. We might find that your rule leads us right in 90% of cases.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 05:57:42 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12707 http://curi.us/comments/show/12707
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Are you familiar with any of Peirce's work?]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 05:47:13 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12706 http://curi.us/comments/show/12706
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Thanks for the continued discussion. I’ll try focus on what I think are your main criticisms and avoid opening up too many parallel conversations. If you would prefer me to prioritize other criticisms then let me know, but let's not try and talk about too many things at the same time.

>If you want to go into details and try to make it a trickier scenario, you'd need a much more detailed scenario that gives way more info including dozens of scientific papers covering the actual issues.

I was trying to keep it simple. I think you have complicated things by introducing “known important failure modes”. Don’t do that. Assume the only difference between the theories is that one has been tested far more than the other. The testing is random, and not biased towards any sort of failure modes, etc. I want to know if the size of the sample matters for you. To do so you need to consider it independently of other factors.

>In the history of philosophy, that is a problem for induction. Most inductivists today think induction does solve that problem of rejecting junk theories with arbitrary exceptions.

The history of induction looks pretty murky for me with a lot of different interpretations. I think Peirce has categorized our inferences best and gives the best account of the logic of induction.

The scientific method for Peirce looks like this.
Hypothesis: “where we find some very curious circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition.”
Deduction: where we derive particular instances (consequences/predictions) from our hypothesis.
Induction: “where we generalize from a number of cases of which something is true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class.”

This is why I say your theory+exception type theories are not a problem for induction, because they are ruled out at the hypothesis stage instead. However, I do believe induction has its role in ruling out these sorts of theories as I demonstrated in my previous response.

> This does not address how to tiebreak between theories that both score 100%. That's a serious problem because there are infinitely many theories that score 100%. So you think you're doing a good job of differentiating theories by assigning different scores, but looking only at the theories with the max score you still have infinitely many left. So your approach results in a massive tie that it doesn't help with. CR does help with that tie.

The majority of these infinite logically possible theories make claims that have no support. In fact, there is strong support in opposition to the class of claims made by these theories. If you want to pose the theory that says my wallet will be transported to the moon in the next second then you are claiming a character for physical objects that has absolutely zero support. That not a single physical object has ever had this sort of character is too much to be overcome by such theories.

Our existing theories and observations tell us which theories are most plausible. These are the ones that we preference and choose to expend resources testing. If we want to trace back to our most fundamental measures of plausibility we end up with our natural reactions and innate ideas.

> It also does not correspond to the actual facts of science, where people design tests to differentiate theories instead of testing randomly.

Testing randomly is very important in science, especially when coming up with a confidence interval/level for the reporting of results. I think of testing randomly as sampling without bias. If you have no reason to think your sample is biased in any particular way, then you are standing on good ground. As I said before, We tend to assume the constancy of the character we are studying unless we have knowledge that says otherwise.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 05:36:16 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12705 http://curi.us/comments/show/12705
Dagny Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
> https://youtu.be/2rziZyy-zE8

Your text is social metaphysics. You avoided clearly saying what you mean. You used ambiguous slang to convey not clear ideas but deniable hints about your social attitudes.]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 02:46:29 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12704 http://curi.us/comments/show/12704
Hard Right Atheist Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
https://youtu.be/2rziZyy-zE8]]>
Mon, 10 Jun 2019 00:55:27 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12703 http://curi.us/comments/show/12703
Anonymous Open Discussion Sun, 09 Jun 2019 15:33:16 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12702 http://curi.us/comments/show/12702 Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Also you said basically to logically derive predictions from theories. You can do that from "All grass is green" but you can't do it from e.g. "Most grass is green". You can't derive any particular predicted observations from that claim. So are you *only* dealing with empirical universal laws? If so, that's pretty limited. And it clarifies the issue that it's desirable and easy to use ones with *no* counter examples, so there's no purpose to your system of differentiating between ones with different frequencies of being wrong.

But you seem to be ignoring me.]]>
Sun, 09 Jun 2019 13:49:27 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12701 http://curi.us/comments/show/12701
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
In the history of philosophy, that is a problem for induction. Most inductivists today think induction does solve that problem of rejecting junk theories with arbitrary exceptions.

If you want induction only for some limited purposes, you should specify exactly what it does and doesn't do, and also what the overall epistemology as a whole is and what other components it has besides induction and what they do. All of that is stuff that ought to already be written down, not stated ad hoc.

> We can do the best we can, but if the universe is in such a way that we are unable to get a representative sample of some phenomena, then that phenomena is outside the limits of our knowledge.

How do you know what is a representative sample? By thinking in some way. So your view of induction *presupposes intelligent thinking*, rather than explaining how thinking works.

If you're going to do that, what you should do next is consider *what comes before induction*. How does the thinking prior to induction work and what is it capable of? And then, what is left over for induction to accomplish, which can't be accomplished by this prior stuff? If the prior stuff is or includes CR, then nothing is left over because CR is universal (it covers *all* thinking).

---

We need to focus. You're giving quotes making new claims instead of following up to a conclusion regarding the prior claims. You said:

>> “In a good inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion, where this degree-of-support might be measured via some numerical scale.”

I asked:

> OK, and where can I read, in detail (with a formula?), which (observational) premises support which conclusions in what degree? Is there a particular thing Peirce wrote which answers this? I want general principles for this which can be used to evaluate anything (rather than the answers being made up on a case by case basis), plus a worked example.

I understand your answer to be: Ignore all non-empirical thinking. Consider the infinite set of empirical implications of a theory. Test a random sample of them and see what percentage of the time it's correct. Call that percentage its "inductive support". Prefer theories with a higher percentage.

This does not address how to tiebreak between theories that both score 100%. That's a serious problem because there are infinitely many theories that score 100%. So you think you're doing a good job of differentiating theories by assigning different scores, but looking only at the theories with the max score you still have infinitely many left. So your approach results in a massive tie that it doesn't help with. CR does help with that tie.

It also does not correspond to the actual facts of science, where people design tests to differentiate theories instead of testing randomly. You've also, contrary to scientific practice, advocated for the high value of theories with known counter examples. Wouldn't it be better to find a variant theory without a known counter example? Why not do that? Why stick with something we know is false when there are infinitely many alternatives that we don't know to be false, and it's trivial to state some of them? For example, if you know of a counter example of "All X are Y" you can consider the variant theory "All X are Y except for Z." This has the advantage of not being known to be false, so isn't it superior? Yet your inductive system is focused on offering varying degrees of support *for refuted theories*, but all the non-refuted theories get the identical score and aren't differentiated.

And there's the problem that you can't random sample infinite sets, and also the problem that even if you had a sample of things to test, you wouldn't be able to test most of the things in the sample (b/c e.g. many of them would involve doing tests in other galaxies). So you want us to do an approximately random sample of only tests which are reasonably convenient/accessible. You have not provided details for how to do this. I want a *set of steps I could follow to perform an induction* (walk me through doing one to show me that it's possible to do one), but you have not provided the steps for how to approximate a random sample of only conveniently testable things and make it representative enough.

You've also attempted to introduce a rule that theories aren't compared with data from before the theory was formed. Something like that. I don't think you really want that rule to be upheld strictly thought, and it isn't how science works. And there are easy workarounds, e.g. form *all logically possible theories* right now and then test all of them at once going forward. We shouldn't be limited to only testing one or two theories at a time.

You also seem to *not treat induction as a starting point of thinking*. In that case, shouldn't we start at the start of your epistemology? If it doesn't start with induction, what does it start with? What are all the things that are prior to induction? You also regard induction as incomplete because it doesn't address non-empirical matters, so what else do you have in your epistemology to cover those? You're limiting induction more than many inductivists do, so you need replacements to cover the stuff you don't think induction does. (And then we could consider things like whether the replacements include the whole of CR in them, or are otherwise complete without ever adding induction into the picture.)]]>
Sun, 09 Jun 2019 13:37:56 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12700 http://curi.us/comments/show/12700
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Depends. You didn't give a detailed scenario so I made reasonable assumptions. If you want to go into details and try to make it a trickier scenario, you'd need a much more detailed scenario that gives way more info including dozens of scientific papers covering the actual issues. Then one could consider what the explanations and criticisms involved are. I thought the point was to see how a CR perspective works in a simple, easy scenario, but now you seem interested in changing to a more difficult scenario.]]>
Sun, 09 Jun 2019 13:07:16 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12699 http://curi.us/comments/show/12699
GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I told Sleepy about the world record video I watched and the short cuts it gave. she wanted to see it. I showed her and got 36 second.

then we decided to keep trying to improve our PRs on the race. she'd keep trying until she beat my PR, then I'd keep trying till I beat hers, and so on.

she got 31 seconds after a couple tries.

then I got 28.56 after a bunch of tries (I restarted a lot cuz it's hard to get the Cheep Cheep cuz of the weird camera angle.)

the world record I watched (which could be an old world record) got 22.59 sec.]]>
Sun, 09 Jun 2019 11:33:48 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12698 http://curi.us/comments/show/12698
GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I watched a world record video on the seaside koopa race. I saw 2 short cuts. the 1st shortcut involved getting a Cheep Cheep, which got rid of the necessity to repeatedly press Y to swim up with the regular Mario character. the 2nd shortcut involved using the springy things to launch me up the plateau where the finish line is. I got around 43 seconds, which is much shorter than what's needed for 1st place master cup.]]>
Sun, 09 Jun 2019 11:10:10 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12697 http://curi.us/comments/show/12697
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
>I didn't assume that. I said if you know some important failure modes, and tested one medicine for them but not the other, then you have a big risk difference.

And if we didn’t know any important failure modes, does the difference in the amount of testing make no difference?

>Then "all grass is green unless it's on mars" will have exactly equal support, right? You aren't dealing with the problem of exceptions or variants.

Sure, if we wanted to test one of your theory+exception type hypotheses we could do so in the same way, and we would very likely find identical levels of support (so long as your exceptional cases are exceptional and not commonplace). This corresponds to the fact that the theory and the theory+exception hypotheses would both lead us right in a very similar proportion of cases, although as you add more exceptions, the less support for these theories overlap.

So this isn’t a problem for induction, but rather a question of how to differentiate good and bad hypotheses, in particular, how to differentiate plausible and implausible hypotheses. We find induction has a role in answering this question. Take for example the floater theory of gravity where DD floats in some special circumstance. We don't have any support for the claim that the principles of motion are dependent on an individuals name, date of birth, position, etc. Instead we have strong support of the opposite, that the principles of motion are independent of such qualities. This is the deductive application of a general rule whose truth has been inferred inductively.

Perhaps there is some not yet observed exceptional case in the universe, with a character unlike anything we have seen before, but to prefer a theory in its favour for no reason whilst ignoring knowledge that speaks against the case is irrational.

>And there is no way to do the random sampling you suggest. How do you pick randomly from an infinite set?

The ideal case is a random sample, free from bias. However, we are limited to what the universe provides us. We can do the best we can, but if the universe is in such a way that we are unable to get a representative sample of some phenomena, then that phenomena is outside the limits of our knowledge. A quote from that article I sent you: “But, though there exists a cause for every event, and that of a kind which is capable of being discovered, yet if there be nothing to guide us to the discovery; if we have to hunt among all the events in the world without any scent; if, for instance, the sex of a child might equally be supposed to depend on the configuration of the planets, on what was going on at the antipodes, or on anything else—then the discovery would have no chance of ever getting made”.

>And won't the correct proportion normally be 100%? If it's 99% then that means we found 1 or more counter examples, so the universal claim is *false*, which is totally different than 99% true. You seem to want to say that false ideas have a lot of support? I think that's bad.

A 99% supported theory is roughly speaking “true”,but precisely speaking “false but strongly supported”. A theory that works in most cases is still incredibly useful, and it would be wrong to just lump it in with the rest of our “false” theories. We may call such a theory “true” when it is expedient to do so.

>You have not given an example where e.g. the amount of support lets us choose to prefer one idea over another. You gave an example where the amount of support is irrelevant because a claim like "all X are Y" is decisively refuted by one counter example.

I think the medicine example is what you're asking for. Even in the case where a theory is refuted it can still be extremely useful to us. We might even later find out that our refutation was wrong. Some theories can be weakly disconfirmed in the same way they can be weakly confirmed.

>Further, I don't want you to write ad hoc explanations of induction. The request was for you to provide writing which already covers this. You did give one link but no relevant quotes from the link and the link only has the word "support" one time (and used in a different sense). The link begins by talking about religion for some reason, which also isn't related to the specific issue we're talking about.

My explanation of induction was not ad hoc. It was generalized, and I provided an example at your request. I’ve given three links by the way. They are separate articles.

Peirce gives us an overview of induction in ‘Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis’:
“Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases of which something is true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class. Or, where we find a certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of cases and infer that it is true of the same proportion of the whole class.”

And in his concluding remarks in ‘The Probability of Induction’:
“When we draw a deductive or analytic conclusion, our rule of inference is that facts of a certain general character are either invariably or in a certain proportion of cases accompanied by facts of another general character. Then our premise being a fact of the former class, we infer with certainty or with the appropriate degree of probability the existence of a fact of the second class. But the rule for synthetic inference is of a different kind. When we sample a bag of beans we do not in the least assume that the fact of some beans being purple involves the necessity or even the probability of other beans being so. On the contrary, the conceptualistic method of treating probabilities, which really amounts simply to the deductive treatment of them, when rightly carried out leads to the result that a synthetic inference has just an even chance in its favor, or in other words is absolutely worthless. The color of one bean is entirely independent of that of another. But synthetic inference is founded upon a classification of facts, not according to their characters, but according to the manner of obtaining them. Its rule is, that a number of facts obtained in a given way will in general more or less resemble other facts obtained in the same way; or, experiences whose conditions are the same will have the same general characters.

In the former case, we know that premises precisely similar in form to those of the given ones will yield true conclusions, just once in a calculable number of times. In the latter case, we only know that premises obtained under circumstances similar to the given ones (though perhaps themselves very different) will yield true conclusions, at least once in a calculable number of times. We may express this by saying that in the case of analytic inference we know the probability of our conclusion (if the premises are true), but in the case of synthetic inferences we only know the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding. As all knowledge comes from synthetic inference, we must equally infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions.”

I’m not sure how familiar you are with Peirce’s works, so I can only guess how useful these quotes will be independent of their logical development.]]>
Sun, 09 Jun 2019 04:41:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12696 http://curi.us/comments/show/12696
Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
How can you know what is important, obvious, or interesting?

Isn't that presupposing you're an intelligent person capable of thinking about such things, *before* you can do induction?

But one of the problems epistemology is trying to address – and the inductive tradition of thought claims to address – is *how can we think*? How can we know what is important, obvious, interesting, or whatever else? Induction is suppose to come *before* that issue, not after. If you put induction after, you need something else before to explain how intelligent thought works. So you'll have to accept CR or come up with some other alternative. But you can't explain how people think and learn using induction *and*, at the same time, make using general purpose intelligent thought be one of the steps used in induction.

CR tells us how knowledge can be created from non-knowledge. Induction claimed to too, but this version of induction doesn't appear to be trying to address that basic epistemological problem.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 16:44:47 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12695 http://curi.us/comments/show/12695
Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> It is easy to see that the number of accidental agreements of this sort would be quite endless. But suppose that, instead of considering a character because of its prevalence in the sample, we designate a character before taking the sample, selecting it for its importance, obviousness, or other point of interest.

This is theory-before-observation, which is agreeing with CR and disagreeing with a large part of the tradition of inductive thought.

And also it doesn't work well because you can come up with "everyone falls when they jump off buildings, except..." in advance and then check a sample of observations. Since the exceptions involve an infinitesimal part of the general case, the probability of randomly running into them is infinitesimal. So we'll get "accidental agreement" between data and between theories with exceptions. This is why CR doesn't advocate *random* testing. It advocates testing key issues that differentiate between theories.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 16:38:59 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12694 http://curi.us/comments/show/12694
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I didn't assume that. I said if you know some important failure modes, and tested one medicine for them but not the other, then you have a big risk difference.

> Given a general claim about the world such as “all grass is green”, we can deduce a number of particular claims such as “my lawn is green” and “the grass at parliament house is green”. If we take a random sample of these particular claims and note the proportion that are true, then this is what gives us our proportionate support for the general claim. We tend to assume the constancy of the character we are studying unless we have knowledge that says otherwise.

Then "all grass is green unless it's on mars" will have exactly equal support, right? You aren't dealing with the problem of exceptions or variants.

And there is no way to do the random sampling you suggest. How do you pick randomly from an infinite set?

And won't the correct proportion normally be 100%? If it's 99% then that means we found 1 or more counter examples, so the universal claim is *false*, which is totally different than 99% true. You seem to want to say that false ideas have a lot of support? I think that's bad.

You have not given an example where e.g. the amount of support lets us choose to prefer one idea over another. You gave an example where the amount of support is irrelevant because a claim like "all X are Y" is decisively refuted by one counter example.

Further, I don't want you to write ad hoc explanations of induction. The request was for you to provide writing which already covers this. You did give one link but no relevant quotes from the link and the link only has the word "support" one time (and used in a different sense). The link begins by talking about religion for some reason, which also isn't related to the specific issue we're talking about.

> I’d like you to elaborate on DD’s BoI quotes that I provided, because I don’t see how they can be understood as refuting the standard belief.

I will be happy to explain how they refute induction *after* you specify what you think induction is. I can't refute something unspecified when you've already tried to deny induction is what CR claims it to be. So we have to do the one thing before the other.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 16:19:59 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12693 http://curi.us/comments/show/12693
Apple’s “Live Listen” feature Frisco Open Discussion
WithApple’s “Live Listen” feature, your iPhone and AirPods can supposedly help you hear someone talking in a noisy environment such as a restaurant.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 14:15:40 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12692 http://curi.us/comments/show/12692
#12688 GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
re 1), in this case it's not about rhythm. you just need to do it fast enough to maintain full speed. any faster pressing won't make you go faster.

re 2), that's about swimming horizontally rather than vertically (which is what I was talking about in the first part of the seaside race). about swimming horizontally, I had seen (either in an article or a video) that you should press ZL and Y at the same time to get a horizontal boost. that doesn't work well for me. I instead press ZL (which starts a ground pound), then hit Y (which boosts me forward). and you have to wait until the boost is completely done before trying ZL again, otherwise something else happens.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 10:22:49 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12691 http://curi.us/comments/show/12691
Anonymous Open Discussion
> FACEBOOK LAWYER SAYS USERS ‘HAVE NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY’

>> A lawyer for Facebook argued in court Wednesday that the social media site’s users “have no expectation of privacy.”

>> “There is no invasion of privacy at all, because there is no privacy,” Snyder said.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 10:11:30 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12690 http://curi.us/comments/show/12690
Dagny Submit Podcast Questions
What makes a bank "central"? Government support to privilege it above other banks. That support involves laws that favor the bank and taxpayer money used to favor it. So, force and more force.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 10:09:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12689 http://curi.us/comments/show/12689
Anonymous Mario Odyssey Discussion
1) if it's like mario 64, you need to press swim button with the correct timing, using a rhythm, not as fast as possible.

2) https://gamefaqs.gamespot.com/boards/200275-super-mario-odyssey/75964857]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 10:08:22 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12688 http://curi.us/comments/show/12688
Seaside race, master cup GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I practiced doing parts of the race that I was having trouble with.

for example, I often crashed at the end of using flowers. so instead of doing the race I practiced picking up flowers and stopping where I wanted to stop. I figured out that I can do a jump and then immediately ground pound.

I also varied the exact route I took thru the race.

with these improvements I got a new PR, but not 1st place.

I don't like the first part of the race where I have to repeatedly pressing B for a while to get out of the water. after a few races my hand gets tired and I can't do the race anymore.

the rest of the game doesn't require repeatedly pressing the same button much so I don't think it's important.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 09:29:59 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12687 http://curi.us/comments/show/12687
Anonymous Submit Podcast Questions Sat, 08 Jun 2019 06:08:02 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12686 http://curi.us/comments/show/12686 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas > When it comes to medical risk, I generally prefer the option where we tested everything we think we should test, as opposed to the new drug which is still undergoing tests we think are important. It's not the number of tests but the question: is there a risk I want tested before I take it (in order to lower my risk) which has not yet been tested? In other words, one drug has known potential risks/dangers that are untested (those constitute a criticism of taking it when there's a better option), the other doesn't.

Endless possible complications could arise when using a new type of medicine. We can’t always assume we know the main modes of failure (where do you think these come from anyway?). What we can assume is that we have a random sample of the effects that this medication has had on others who tried it. Isn’t a greater sample size much more preferable here?

> OK, and where can I read, in detail (with a formula?), which (observational) premises support which conclusions in what degree? Is there a particular thing Peirce wrote which answers this? I want general principles for this which can be used to evaluate anything (rather than the answers being made up on a case by case basis), plus a worked example.

Given a general claim about the world such as “all grass is green”, we can deduce a number of particular claims such as “my lawn is green” and “the grass at parliament house is green”. If we take a random sample of these particular claims and note the proportion that are true, then this is what gives us our proportionate support for the general claim. We tend to assume the constancy of the character we are studying unless we have knowledge that says otherwise.

Relevant writing of Peirce would be the following.
[The Order of Nature](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/June_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_V)

> FYI this is the kind of viewpoint that CR criticized at length. That's a really standard belief.

I’d like you to elaborate on DD’s BoI quotes that I provided, because I don’t see how they can be understood as refuting the standard belief.]]>
Sat, 08 Jun 2019 00:48:42 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12685 http://curi.us/comments/show/12685
curi How To Get Unstuck
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XyQ311sR3CY]]>
Fri, 07 Jun 2019 14:12:54 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12684 http://curi.us/comments/show/12684
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
When it comes to medical risk, I generally prefer the option where we tested everything we think we should test, as opposed to the new drug which is still undergoing tests we think are important. It's not the number of tests but the question: is there a risk I want tested before I take it (in order to lower my risk) which has not yet been tested? In other words, one drug has known potential risks/dangers that are untested (those constitute a criticism of taking it when there's a better option), the other doesn't.


> “In a good inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion, where this degree-of-support might be measured via some numerical scale.”

OK, and where can I read, in detail (with a formula?), which (observational) premises support which conclusions in what degree? Is there a particular thing Peirce wrote which answers this? I want general principles for this which can be used to evaluate anything (rather than the answers being made up on a case by case basis), plus a worked example.

FYI this is the kind of viewpoint that CR criticized at length. That's a really standard belief.]]>
Fri, 07 Jun 2019 14:04:44 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12683 http://curi.us/comments/show/12683
curi What To Read Fri, 07 Jun 2019 11:21:34 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12682 http://curi.us/comments/show/12682 Anonymous Submit Podcast Questions Fri, 07 Jun 2019 11:09:55 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12681 http://curi.us/comments/show/12681 curi What To Read
It's the first of ~5 books that share a major character. I don't yet know how related the plots are.]]>
Fri, 07 Jun 2019 11:03:48 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12680 http://curi.us/comments/show/12680
curi Submit Podcast Questions Fri, 07 Jun 2019 10:43:36 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12679 http://curi.us/comments/show/12679 Anonymous Subjective and Objective Fri, 07 Jun 2019 10:42:43 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12678 http://curi.us/comments/show/12678 An objective test? Anonymous Subjective and Objective Fri, 07 Jun 2019 05:42:45 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12677 http://curi.us/comments/show/12677 Anonymous Submit Podcast Questions Fri, 07 Jun 2019 03:54:59 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12676 http://curi.us/comments/show/12676 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> Because e.g. it has a lot of potential failure modes that people think are worth checking (testing) but which have not yet been checked, whereas with the second option there aren't a bunch of known risks in need of further investigation.

There are infinite potential ways in which either option could fail. The only difference between each option is that one has been tested more than the other and it has a known failure case. Despite this known failure, you still choose this option. All else being equal, it seems you preference theories that have survived a greater number of tests. How do you account for this?

> 1) Do you think you have a view of induction with *no decisive refutations* that you know about?

Yes.

> 2) Is your view of induction *written down* in detail?

My view of induction is pretty well summed up by what you find in a dictionary, on wikipedia, or in stanfords philosophy encyclopedia.

“In a good inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion, where this degree-of-support might be measured via some numerical scale.”

I’ve found Peirce’s account of the logic of the scientific method compelling. He provides a detailed account of induction that I am willing to defend for the most part. Relevant writings by him are provided below. Of the first article, the last two sections are most relevant. You could skim everything leading up to that.
[The Probability of Induction](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_12/April_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_IV)

[Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI)

I won’t pretend that I have a complete understanding of the depths of Peirce’s argument and I certainly have found some of his remarks questionable (e.g. reality is where the final opinion will be led after sufficient investigation), but nothing major enough for me to abandon induction. Peirce believes induction is justified logically, but I am more sympathetic to the view that it is an evolved faculty of reasoning.]]>
Fri, 07 Jun 2019 03:49:44 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12675 http://curi.us/comments/show/12675
curi What To Read
Today I'm rereading *The Puppet Masters*. Not a juvenile. I'm enjoying it. It involves spies and aliens. No more comments cuz I don't wanna spoil the plot.]]>
Thu, 06 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12674 http://curi.us/comments/show/12674
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Great.

> Why is the first option higher risk than the second option?

Because e.g. it has a lot of potential failure modes that people think are worth checking (testing) but which have not yet been checked, whereas with the second option there aren't a bunch of known risks in need of further investigation.

> My rebuttal to DD's criticism of induction (as quoted from BoI) is that he has attacked a version of induction (or maybe just premises) that I don't see anyone holding. So yes, he has not addressed my view of induction.

OK. So in order to address your view of induction – either with new material or by telling you how existing CR arguments address it – I'll need detailed information about your view.

So I have questions:

1) Do you think you have a view of induction with *no decisive refutations* that you know about?

I want to differentiate weaknesses (acceptable) with reasons something is actually *false* or *cannot work* (not acceptable). And I want to check whether you already know that your view is false, or not. Hopefully not, but a lot of people have kind of given up on finding something that is not refuted, and just try to choose which false view is less bad, so I want to ask.

For example, "That seems inelegant" would typically be a minor weakness that isn't a reason to give up on an idea. Whereas "That has an internal contradiction" or "That contradicts this observation" would generally be decisive refutations. (After a decisive refutation, variant ideas can still be considered. A refutation of X is sometimes totally irrelevant to X2 even if X and X2 are similar. Sometimes one can find a similar idea which isn't decisively refuted, but sometimes people fail to come up with such a variant (while also dealing with the constraints of choosing a variant which is not decisively refuted by a long list of other well known and standard criticisms, because we don't want to avoid one refutation by walking right into another. The point is to come up with a variant with no known decisive refutations, which sometimes is easy and sometimes hard).)

2) Is your view of induction *written down* in detail?

I'd like to be able to read and review the explanations, including details, that I'd need in order to understand the view, analyze it, agree or disagree, refute it, etc. The writing should be reasonably unambiguous, consistent with itself, cover the key issues in the field, and be complete enough that I don't keep getting told new information that wasn't included after I try to reply.

If it's written down, I'll want to know where. If not, how should I or CR respond to it?

I would expect any sources you refer me to would be things that you have read in full, and *take full responsibility for any errors in*. If you want to use a source which has an error you want to disown, there would need to exist a meta-source which says e.g. "Chapter 3 of book B, except disregard claim C. The argument stands with claim C omitted." Or a replacement claim could be given, or something else. The point is sources should either be error free (as far as you know, so any criticism would be important information) or else the errors should be documented and the workarounds/replacements/alternatives also documented (so then the pairing of the original source, plus the extra information about the error and its solution – that pairing as a whole – doesn't have a known error.)

FYI, I am familiar with the inductivist literature in general (many traditions of it, not just a couple), and have discussed with hundreds of inductivists. And FYI, in my experience, both the literature and the people today routinely hold the very same ideas that CR criticizes. If you know of other viewpoints, great. In the alternative, it may be that CR has criticized the viewpoints you advocate but you don't understand how the criticisms or how they apply. Also, if you refer to some standard literature or ideas, there is a good chance that I'll already be familiar with them, which will make conversation easier.]]>
Thu, 06 Jun 2019 12:52:43 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12673 http://curi.us/comments/show/12673
Anonymous Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I misread you then. I thought you were offering an alternative account of why my example arbitrary theory is no good.

> I think you want to debate. That's fine. If you want to switch to Q&A, just ask, but let's try to keep to one at a time. I will make 2 more brief comments in hopes they're helpful. Then I will try to focus on one main debate point and I will try to keep it short.

Debate or Q&A, whichever it is, I'm happy with how thing's have gone so far; getting a lot out of this conversation. I'll try avoid opening up too many parallel conversations though.

> No, I didn't say that. The topic I was discussing was whether explain = deduce. In CR literature, they are very different, so you'll misinterpret. I'm not denying you can deduce things, I'm saying deducing is a different thing than explaining.

We say Newton's laws explain the motion of simple machines. We also say Newton's laws can be used to deduce the motion of simple machines.

I don't see why this is so nonsensical. An explanation (newton's laws) tells us what/how/why and from this we can deduce consequences (motion of simple machines).


> (Making reasonable assumptions to fill in the blanks for the scenario), I would criticize the first option for being high risk. If something works 99.9% of the time, that is not a refutation of the theory "I should use this." It would refute the theory "That medicine works 100% of the time.", which is a separate matter than whether I should take it.

Why is the first option higher risk than the second option?

Would you be ok with using option 2 if you failed to refute "I will use option 2 because it works more than 95% of the time"?


> # Debate


> OK, so the broad overview of your rebuttal to CR regarding induction is: *CR refutes many versions of induction (correctly?), but does not address the version of induction you believe.* Do I have your position right?

My rebuttal to DD's criticism of induction (as quoted from BoI) is that he has attacked a version of induction (or maybe just premises) that I don't see anyone holding. So yes, he has not addressed my view of induction.]]>
Thu, 06 Jun 2019 06:38:26 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12672 http://curi.us/comments/show/12672
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> Then it is an insufficient criticism for refuting my example.

I think this discussion is getting confused because it's mixing two things: debate and Q&A. I answered a question and then you said my answer was an insufficient criticism. It wasn't trying to be a criticism of your example, it was explaining something (which happened to be a criticism of something else) because you asked.

One of the major differences between debates and Q&A is that in debates focusing on *one topic at time*, and pursuing it to a conclusion, is important. Having a large number of short back and forths, instead of writing long things, is also more important in debate. There are other differences in how I reply depending on what we're doing.

I think you want to debate. That's fine. If you want to switch to Q&A, just ask, but let's try to keep to one at a time. I will make 2 more brief comments in hopes they're helpful. Then I will try to focus on one main debate point and I will try to keep it short.

> So you disagree that we can deduce the motion of an object from such laws?

No, I didn't say that. The topic I was discussing was whether explain = deduce. In CR literature, they are very different, so you'll misinterpret. I'm not denying you can deduce things, I'm saying deducing is a different thing than explaining.

> Say you have two similar medicinal options that are guessed to cure your pains; one has been tried 3 times (100% success), and another 100'000 times (99.9%) success. Do you choose the first option because it is not in your "non-refuted" category?

(Making reasonable assumptions to fill in the blanks for the scenario), I would criticize the first option for being high risk. If something works 99.9% of the time, that is not a refutation of the theory "I should use this." It would refute the theory "That medicine works 100% of the time.", which is a separate matter than whether I should take it.

---

# Debate

> DD seems to attack a form of inductivism that supposes that all knowledge comes from induction alone. My view is that induction is just one part of the picture.

OK, so the broad overview of your rebuttal to CR regarding induction is: *CR refutes many versions of induction (correctly?), but does not address the version of induction you believe.* Do I have your position right?]]>
Wed, 05 Jun 2019 21:51:04 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12671 http://curi.us/comments/show/12671
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Lets stick with how CR applies to scientific/empirical theories for now.

> It wasn't a replacement, it was just a different criticism.

Then it is an insufficient criticism for refuting my example.


> The claim "every element of the theory must be involved in explaining some past observations" is incorrect, both because of non-empirical theories and because it disallows any predictions about the future (which are not necessary for explaining the past).

My claim does not disallow predictions about the future. Because claims about the future may still be involved in explaining the past.

The same claims that account for some past observations may be predicting future observation too.

> Then quote an anti-induction CR argument – pick one of the ones you consider *best and most important – and point out an error in it.

DD seems to attack a form of inductivism that supposes that all knowledge comes from induction alone. My view is that induction is just one part of the picture.

So when DD says "inductivism purports to explain how science obtains predictions about experiences", he is attacking an idea of induction that I don't think anyone holds to. Deriving predictions is the role of deduction, not induction.

His other critisism is "The second fundamental misconception in inductivism is that scientific theories predict that ‘the future will resemble the past’, and that ‘the unseen resembles the seen’ and so on."

I'm not entirely sure what his getting at with this. He goes on to point out a number of counter-examples where the future is not like the past, etc. So I wonder if he is suggesting that induction requires the future to be like the past in all cases, and is refuting this with counter examples. I don't know anyone who holds this view of induction either.

> This question shows major lack of familiarity with DD's writing, which means you aren't in a good position to judge whether his anti-inductive arguments are correct.

I have read chapter 4 before, but I didn't remember it clearly. I've approached CR through Popper, DD, David Miller, and others. I'm still trying to get a better understanding of their views, but their are some fundamental problems that keeping surfacing for me.


> If you reject those solutions, God can *appear* to solve certain problems, but it doesn't really. Conjecturing some amount of arbitrary complexity to solve a problem with *less* complexity than that is only making things worse (overall), not solving anything. It's *increasing*, not decreasing, the amount of complexity in one's worldview that isn't explained well, isn't constrained well, isn't understood well, etc.

The god explains why the sun moves around. It solves the problem. Sure, the god now requires some explaining, but all explanations have unexplained elements. We never have a theory without any unexplained elements. We can explain one thing in terms of a new thing. We now have the problem of explaining that new thing. We continue this to infinity.

> That's a common misunderstanding of CR. Do you think you could state what CR means by explanation? And "newtons laws" is ambiguous about whether you mean just the mathematical formulas (which only predict) or also the explanations we know of that go with them.

The laws required for this sort of deduction would be in their mathematical form. So you disagree that we can deduce the motion of an object from such laws? Isn't it similar to a deduction from mathematical axioms?

> I agree that would be a form of induction. But CR *does not do that*. (Popper did consider doing something like that in his earlier work, which has led to confusion about this.)

> I divide theories into exactly two categories: refuted and non-refuted. Theory X is better than theory Y if and only if theory X is in the category "non-refuted" and theory Y is in the category "refuted". There are no degrees of betterness, and failed falsifications do not make theories better (except maybe in some loose, informal, non-rigorous way – I'm just talking about what is technically correct, not about informal approximations).

Say you have two similar medicinal options that are guessed to cure your pains; one has been tried 3 times (100% success), and another 100'000 times (99.9%) success. Do you choose the first option because it is not in your "non-refuted" category?]]>
Wed, 05 Jun 2019 20:10:15 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12670 http://curi.us/comments/show/12670
Anonymous Submit Podcast Questions
Context is I was watching this lecture which is very critical of FRB and calls it fraud https://youtu.be/IIztM-B_Eeg

I understand some Austrian stuff about inflation and business cycle theory but have always found the FRB topic a bit confusing]]>
Wed, 05 Jun 2019 16:44:54 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12669 http://curi.us/comments/show/12669
Dagny Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
A) you are an inductivist. you think induction is true. [1]

B) you are trying to interpret h2v in a way that it's true

given A, you have to find a way to interpret h2v as induction or else it wouldn't be true (which would violate B).

I think DD would prefer that you claim h2v is false due to the lack of induction, rather than try to bring him into the inductivist camp. This would lead to discussing what I think is the right topic: *whether induction is correct*. You apparently disagree with DD/CR about that, so I think that's a better place to begin than whether h2v is inductive.

I think the best way to discuss that, right now, with you, is by you trying to understand (primarily) and criticize (secondarily) CR passages about induction. Quote a few paragraphs [2] and say both what you think it says and why it's false (not weak or non-best, but decisively and clearly wrong). Weaker criticisms could be discussed after we reach agreement about the decisive ones.

Or if you don't like that approach, you could suggest something else.

*Footnotes:*

[1] I think you believe/claim induction works, as opposed to CR which claims induction is impossible. CR says no one has ever learned the slightest thing by induction because induction *can't be done*. There is no set of steps a person can follow which is 1) induction and 2) possible. (This criticism of induction is not about whether induction is justified or rational.)

[2] For sources, please stick with DD's 2 books, the KP selections from http://fallibleideas.com/books#Popper and ET's writing. That's where the best CR arguments are.]]>
Wed, 05 Jun 2019 14:58:07 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12668 http://curi.us/comments/show/12668
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Yes. Except I'd say we try to *criticize* our guesses. "Falsify" commonly refers only to empirical criticism, not all criticism. To avoid confusion, I use "criticize" or "refute" to refer to all types of criticisms, and "empirically falsify" for empirical criticism only.

> roughly: the more failed falsification attempts the better.

Very, very roughly, yes. But counting attempts is not actually a good way to judge. It runs into major problems.

> The problem in this situation is to explain some phenomena, but as you say, there are infinite logically possible (many arbitrary) theories that could explain the same phenomena. So "it must solve a problem" is not a replacement for "every element of the theory must be involved in explaining some past observations".

It wasn't a replacement, it was just a different criticism.

The claim "every element of the theory must be involved in explaining some past observations" is incorrect, both because of non-empirical theories and because it disallows any predictions about the future (which are not necessary for explaining the past).

> I have read their arguments against induction. I do not find them convincing.

Then quote an anti-induction CR argument – pick one of the ones you consider *best and most important – and point out an error in it.

> Where can I find this criterion for what exists?

The title of chapter 4 of DD's book *The Fabric of Reality* is "Criteria for Reality".

This question shows major lack of familiarity with DD's writing, which means you aren't in a good position to judge whether his anti-inductive arguments are correct. I suggest instead of trying to refute CR (as per the previous section) you focus more on learning what it says. E.g., before trying to refute an anti-induction CR argument, I think it'd be better to try to *state one in a way that a CR expert would agree with*, in order to test if your understanding of what CR says matches the understanding of the CR ppl or not. (Actually I'd recommend this as a good place to start anyway, with anyone, even if they were more familiar with the literature.)

> Gods pulling the sun around the earth to explain the seasons does solve a problem.

Yes but I already have other solutions to that problem, so I don't need God. God doesn't solve any open problem *I* have.

If you reject those solutions, God can *appear* to solve certain problems, but it doesn't really. Conjecturing some amount of arbitrary complexity to solve a problem with *less* complexity than that is only making things worse (overall), not solving anything. It's *increasing*, not decreasing, the amount of complexity in one's worldview that isn't explained well, isn't constrained well, isn't understood well, etc.

> With newtons laws I explain the motion of many simple machines. I infer their motion deductively from the laws. This is how I see them as similar.

That's a common misunderstanding of CR. Do you think you could state what CR means by explanation? And "newtons laws" is ambiguous about whether you mean just the mathematical formulas (which only predict) or also the explanations we know of that go with them.

> Instances of failed falsification are instances of successful confirmations. Thinking better of a theory in general because you failed to falsify it in a number of instances is a form of induction.

I agree that would be a form of induction. But CR *does not do that*. (Popper did consider doing something like that in his earlier work, which has led to confusion about this.)

I divide theories into exactly two categories: refuted and non-refuted. Theory X is better than theory Y if and only if theory X is in the category "non-refuted" and theory Y is in the category "refuted". There are no degrees of betterness, and failed falsifications do not make theories better (except maybe in some loose, informal, non-rigorous way – I'm just talking about what is technically correct, not about informal approximations).]]>
Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:40:30 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12667 http://curi.us/comments/show/12667
Anonymous Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
We guess, and then we also try and falsify our guess right? roughly: the more failed falsification attempts the better.

>> It is arbitrary, but not so much if we happened to have a wealth of observations of this behavior.

> What is addressed to solving a problem, and what isn't, depends on the current problem situation: what problems we have to solve, including problems related to ideas or to observations we want to understand better.

The problem in this situation is to explain some phenomena, but as you say, there are infinite logically possible (many arbitrary) theories that could explain the same phenomena. So "it must solve a problem" is not a replacement for "every element of the theory must be involved in explaining some past observations".

> No, some new ideas aren't general. "That dog is black", regarding a particular dog, is thought or said for a first time.

Ok, we can include particular ideas too if you like. My point still stands.

> But induction can't and doesn't work, as explained by Popper and Deutsch. Have you read their arguments and come up with a refutation of their reasoning about why it doesn't work?

I have read their arguments against induction. I do not find them convincing. I agree with Hume, as do they, that you end up in a circle trying to justify induction rationally. As to the solution to this problem, my solution is closer to Hume's solution. I think induction is a part of our rationality. It is a part of our nature.

Just because induction cannot be justified doesn't mean it is wrong.

>When I asked you questions about it, e.g. to specify which observations support which ideas, you were not able to give any inductive solution.

The observations that support an idea are it's consequences that have been found to be true. It's the same as those consequences that we failed to falsify.

> CRists reject god for not solving a problem, not for lack of observation. See DD's criterion for what exists.

Where can I find this criterion for what exists?

Gods pulling the sun around the earth to explain the seasons does solve a problem. My theory that a particular dance will cure someone's disease also solves a problem.

> Explained does not mean "deduced" and *is not similar to deduction*. Where are you getting that?

With newtons laws I explain the motion of many simple machines. I infer their motion deductively from the laws. This is how I see them as similar.


> Things are tentatively accepted as true due to *lack of refutation* (lack of known error). The positive support approaches don't work when you try to work out the details. They have been refuted by CR.

Instances of failed falsification are instances of successful confirmations. Thinking better of a theory in general because you failed to falsify it in a number of instances is a form of induction.]]>
Wed, 05 Jun 2019 01:16:31 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12666 http://curi.us/comments/show/12666
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
We choose constraints when we guess they may serve a useful purpose, and we don't see anything wrong with them.

> It is arbitrary, but not so much if we happened to have a wealth of observations of this behavior.

What is addressed to solving a problem, and what isn't, depends on the current problem situation: what problems we have to solve, including problems related to ideas or to observations we want to understand better.

> Let me put this to you. Any theory that says something new about the world puts forward a new general claim.

No, some new ideas aren't general. "That dog is black", regarding a particular dog, is thought or said for a first time.

> but that doesn't mean the lower level explanation's claims aren't being rendered true via induction.

But induction can't and doesn't work, as explained by Popper and Deutsch. Have you read their arguments and come up with a refutation of their reasoning about why it doesn't work? When I asked you questions about it, e.g. to specify which observations support which ideas, you were not able to give any inductive solution. Your attempt at a solution was the *non-inductive* idea that ideas should be aimed to solve problems, including to help us understand observations.

> We also reference our lack of observations to reject theories, such as the existence of a particular god.

CRists reject god for not solving a problem, not for lack of observation. See DD's criterion for what exists.

> That's what I'm interested. A good theory of knowledge.

CR says knowledge is information which has been evolutionarily improved to better solve some problem(s). This makes it adapted, which means random variations are very likely to make it worse rather than better (regarding the problem(s) it aims to solve). Or, equivalently, conjectures which we don't know a refutation of.

> Newtons gravitation and his concept of force were not explained (deduced) from other explanations.

Explained does not mean "deduced" and *is not similar to deduction*. Where are you getting that?

> Instead it was a new claim about the world (conjecture), rendered true from all of the vast phenomena it successfully explained.

Things are tentatively accepted as true due to *lack of refutation* (lack of known error). The positive support approaches don't work when you try to work out the details. They have been refuted by CR.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 19:01:31 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12665 http://curi.us/comments/show/12665
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Why do we choose to let this constrain us though? Is it not related to the fact that in all our observations of motion, it has never depended on such parochial details. Isn't it a constraint because it is what we want to capture with our explanation?

Consider a theory that says people will float depending on how hard they clench their fist. It is arbitrary, but not so much if we happened to have a wealth of observations of this behavior.

If a theory is trying to explain some phenomena, then it is constrained by what observations we have in relation to that phenomena.

Let me put this to you. Any theory that says something new about the world puts forward a new general claim. This claim either:
1) is explained by other accepted theories, which in turn put forward their own general claims.
OR
2) is accepted as knowledge through induction.

So when you say that not all explanations are explaining just observations, but also sometimes other explanations, that is a instance of (1), but that doesn't mean the lower level explanation's claims aren't being rendered true via induction.

Newtons gravitation and his concept of force were not explained (deduced) from other explanations. Instead it was a new claim about the world (conjecture), rendered true from all of the vast phenomena it successfully explained. This is an application of (2).

> Past observation is involved via argument: we sometimes make critical arguments that use observations. And we actually have arguments, which use certain observations from certain experiments, to conclude that Newton's laws are false.

We also reference our lack of observations to reject theories, such as the existence of a particular god.

> Things like non-arbitrary or h2v have more detailed versions of them. There's a lot more substance to them than the slogan. But no matter how much detail I gave, you could always desire more.

I don't expect you to possess infinite levels of explanation. It has to start somewhere for us.

> I think h2v and non-arbitrary are useful for understanding epistemology and what knowledge is, and for dealing with certain types of abstract issues.

That's what I'm interested. A good theory of knowledge.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 18:47:02 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12664 http://curi.us/comments/show/12664
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Newton's theories are more constrained than "Stuff moves". They are designed under constraints like that they must provide a general mathematical law that doesn't depend on time, place, or other parochial details.

Newton's theories solve the problem of helping us understand motion. So e.g. "Joe is tall." would not be a viable replacement theory, even if true, because it's not addressing the problem.

Past observation is involved via argument: we sometimes make critical arguments that use observations. And we actually have arguments, which use certain observations from certain experiments, to conclude that Newton's laws are false. However, that critical argument only refutes Newton's laws for some purposes, e.g. the purpose of being a universally and exactly true theory of the physics of motion. It doesn't refute them as a good enough approximation in various ranges of circumstances (which is why it's fine for us to use them in this discussion).

In general, in critical discussions, we have *shared premises*. We agree on some things, either because we both share an idea or because we decide to accept those things for the purpose of the discussion. We then argue using those shared premises. In a different discussion, we can use different premises. No premises are absolute or unquestionable. However, at any given time, we can only discuss some things, not everything. We use ideas X, Y and Z to discuss W. Then later we critically consider X in terms of A, B and Z. And so on. Everything is improvable this way.

Things like non-arbitrary or h2v have more detailed versions of them. There's a lot more substance to them than the slogan. But no matter how much detail I gave, you could always desire more. We're only at the beginning of infinity. Our ignorance is infinite. There is infinite more stuff to learn. Our situation is always using ideas not because of any positive justification but merely because we don't know an error with them. We prefer ideas without known errors to ones with known errors. I don't know an error with my way of thinking about non-arbitrary, and I can often find discussion partners who understand enough of what I mean (and don't object to it) for us to make progress in discussion using it, so it works to discuss in terms of it.

Part of why these ideas usually aren't a big problem in discussion, even without giving more detail, is because I generally only use them in limited ways. If someone wants to suggest arbitrary exceptions to gravity, OK I'll say arbitrary stuff is bad. But people don't usually want to do that. They usually want to argue for something they believe in good faith like that that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is false, and we end up arguing physics details, not calling each other's views arbitrary. I think h2v and non-arbitrary are useful for understanding epistemology and what knowledge is, and for dealing with certain types of abstract issues, but they are generally bad things to bring up when discussing some more specific topic and both people are being reasonable. Nevertheless I've written extensively about further details of epistemology, as have DD and Popper. Besides my [websites](https://elliottemple.com) and [Popper reading recommendations](http://fallibleideas.com/books), there's also well over 100,000 pages of forum archives where one can find many discussions elaborating on epistemology details. Some of the archives are downloadable at https://curi.us/ebooks]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 17:45:25 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12663 http://curi.us/comments/show/12663
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I've been presented these same principles before, but when I have insisted on asking "why" these principles work, I end up with a circular argument, or with hints of induction.

For example, people will complain about "arbitrary" elements of a theory, but if what they mean by arbitrary is "not connected to any past observations", then they make exactly the point I am trying to make.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 17:26:40 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12662 http://curi.us/comments/show/12662
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
> That is what makes good explanations essential to science: it is only when a theory is a good explanation – hard to vary – that it even matters whether it is testable. Bad explanations are equally useless whether they are testable or not.

Here he presents h2v as an issue to worry about *prior to* whether a theory is empirical or testable at all.

> I might grant you that h2v could really mean that a good theory is constrained by critisism in general, but then isn't it saying nothing more than "good theories have survived critisism".

Roughly, yes, that's what it's saying. I tried to explain to DD, on multiple occasions, before BoI came out, that h2v isn't especially deep or important compared to other CR ideas (it's very deep and important compared to induction). It's one way, of many, to explain what knowledge is. DD chose to go ahead with presenting h2v as a crucial insight in the book anyway. I don't consider that a big problem. There is lots of room for leeway in how to attempt to explain ideas which are hard to explain to people successfully. It's good for a variety of approaches to be tried. His approach does have various upsides and lots of people have liked it.

h2v isn't wrong but IMO it also isn't superior to other ways of talking about knowledge: ideas that survive criticism, non-arbitrary ideas, ideas that are more constrained, ideas that solve problems, ideas that are adapted to a purpose, etc. (Or, more generally, information rather than ideas, since genes have adapted information which is knowledge but isn't really "ideas".) Or: knowledge is what you get from evolution (replication with variation and selection. the selection is in regards to some kinda goal, purpose, problem, set of criticisms, something like that. the variation can work a lot of different ways as long as it's not too bounded.)

Where people get stuck, I think, is more about empiricism than about which explanation of knowledge is presented (and anyway DD has presented other explanations of what knowledge is in his books, too). And BoI does have a section criticizing empiricism. DD, like Popper, tried to tell people to focus more on explanations and less on data, but it's a hard message to get across to people.

> All we know of a phenomena is our observations of it right?

No, most of our knowledge is not empirical, it's conceptual and explanatory. E.g. I know things about the inside of the sun even though I've never observed it.

> What it purports to explain is our observations right?

Most of our explanations and criticisms are more about *other explanations and criticisms* than about observations. We have explanations of explanations of explanations of explanations. We have a huge web of ideas which are interconnected in complex ways. People routinely take 2-10 ideas, and no observations, and make another idea. Originally, perhaps more of the ideas were related to observations or only a few levels removed from observations, but now tons of ideas are only distantly related to observations if at all. And ideas can and do gain autonomy from distant foundations even if they once had those foundations (this non-foundationalism is a CR idea which is discussed eg here https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/fallible-ideas/r9KDPJUwg88/eRa1meO4AgAJ ). And many ideas have always been pretty purely non-empirical, e.g. ideas about the *methods* of rational thinking or the *logic* of economics are not about explaining observations. The connection of moral values to observations has also long been doubted. And it's only via non-empirical ideas that we're able to interpret our observations in the first place, so everything depends on theory (see e.g. Popper's explanations that all observation is theory-laden).]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 16:15:25 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12661 http://curi.us/comments/show/12661
Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion Tue, 04 Jun 2019 15:57:40 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12660 http://curi.us/comments/show/12660 Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion Tue, 04 Jun 2019 15:52:57 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12659 http://curi.us/comments/show/12659 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I would suggest that the main critisism that h2v highlights is lack of evidential support for a particular claim.

I see this when DD talks about bad theories being barely connected with the "phenomena" they are trying to explain. All we know of a phenomena is our observations of it right? He points out how gods can be freely varied without the theory saying anything different about the phenomena.

Or when he says a h2v theory can't be changed whilst still being able to explain what it purports to explain. What it purports to explain is our observations right?

While DD might have something else in mind, all his examples seem to point out theories that are bad because they lack support for their claims.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 15:32:09 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12658 http://curi.us/comments/show/12658
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Yes, preferring theories that say more (without being wrong) is a type of non-empirical constraint or criticism (we use it to argue against theories that say less).

> Since the theories are compatible, I think the choice is yours.

People want help making such choices, and it's a major role of epistemology to provide that help. It's not an arbitrary choice, some choices are better than others, so people want guidance about how to choose well. CR and h2v try to help with that. Induction also tries to help with it.

> I don't think theories which say "I don't know" about the future is a problem hard-to-vary was trying to address.

I can tell you, from discussions with DD (I've had thousands and also did extensive editing for BoI), that that is one of the problems h2v is meant to address (in DD's opinion). The way it addresses it is via non-empirical constraints on variation like preferring to say more (it's not that simple, but something kinda like that) and preferring more simple and elegant theories (which is not a simple thing to do or give the details of, but we do use ideas along those lines).

DD never meant h2v to be focused on empirical data. It's general purpose, but you interpreted it with a focus on empirical data. That's a common interpretation because of common non-CR ideas that most people hold which lead people to think that way.

Anyway, are you now willing to withdraw the claim that h2v is inductivist, or do you still have another way to try to argue that? (BTW I don't even think h2v is a perfect idea, I just don't think it's inductivist.)]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 13:41:03 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12657 http://curi.us/comments/show/12657
curi Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
No, *ideas are the solution to violence*. 99% of violence-prevent is due to ideas, particularly moral ideas. Most Americans don't want to be violent criminals (or any kind of criminal). They don't want to be thugs, rapists, murderers, robbers.

Police are the *third* line of defense against violence, not the main one.

The second line of defense is self-defense. In most potentially violent situations, the police are not going to show up on time. It's up to you to e.g. run away or use a gun to protect your family. Police are more about punishing major crimes after the fact, and also thereby deterring crime. Sometimes they help with crimes in progress but they aren't very reliable for that. When Brook says if a Muslim does an honor killing, put him in jail, and he gives the impression that's a solution, he's neglecting that 99% of the time police catch and jail honor killers *after at least one person is already dead*.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 13:31:51 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12656 http://curi.us/comments/show/12656
Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
Context: Brook is an anti-semite.

He gave a speech where he criticized helping others altruistically but said helping *productive* people is self-interested. Then he said that the US fighting WWII to help the European Jews would have been a bad idea which would not have been in our interest, thus implying (contrary to fact) that Jews aren't productive.

I asked about it and his colleague, Harry Binswanger, clarified what was meant: Karl Popper is a villain who would have deserved to die in the holocaust, and the smart people left before the Holocaust. Rather than walk anything back, Binswanger suggested that any Jew who died in the holocaust was dumb for staying in Germany (he said this despite being aware e.g. that Roosevelt turned away Jews fleeing Nazi Germany.)

See also:

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/fallible-ideas/f7eefH6zbLI/DZwX6AzZ-OkJ]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 13:18:44 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12655 http://curi.us/comments/show/12655
Anonymous Open Discussion
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1a-lhjmfPw]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 13:00:15 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12654 http://curi.us/comments/show/12654
Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
> https://youtu.be/995Riq8JdUo

> Sunny & friends on Yaron Brook

Jfc ~17m in vid, Yaron brook concedes Muslims bringing bad ideas to US but compares it to Jews (!) bringing bad ideas to US in earlier wave of immigration in late 19th century. Basically, nbd!! Ppl bring bad ideas here all the time but US culture SO STRONG np.

I think a unified US culture is disintegrating under left wing assault and there are basically two cultural groups (traditional Americans and leftists) in existence now that have little in common. More Muslim immigration doesn't help the traditional Americans ..]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 12:58:24 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12653 http://curi.us/comments/show/12653
curi Mario Odyssey Discussion Tue, 04 Jun 2019 10:29:49 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12652 http://curi.us/comments/show/12652 Anonymous Open Thread: Objectivism Discussion
https://youtu.be/995Riq8JdUo

Sunny & friends on Yaron Brook]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 09:50:29 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12651 http://curi.us/comments/show/12651
Getting the hint art moons GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
The hint art shows an area in the lake kingdom. So I went there and explored a bit. I noticed that the hint art shows 2 floors and a few pillars in a circle on the top floor. So I went searching for areas like that. It was easy to find.

I moved on to the Snow kingdom to get the hint art moon there. I got 2 more moons there, using the parrot's hints. The hint art shows the lost kingdom, so I went there. I found it.

I moved on to the Seaside kingdom. Hmm. That's the one with the word keep and a purple moon above it. I don't get it what it's saying.

To be continued...]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 09:25:20 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12650 http://curi.us/comments/show/12650
Anonymous Submit Podcast Questions Tue, 04 Jun 2019 08:08:41 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12649 http://curi.us/comments/show/12649 Got more moons in Bowser and Moon kingdoms GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I went to the Moon kingdom and got all but 4 moons.

One is the dog again.

One is hint art.

One involving flying to a chest. I explored the area a bunch. There are 2 flying characters I could take control of. AFAIK I explored everywhere using those 2 characters. I haven't seen a chest in those areas.

And there's one that I have no hints about besides its location on the map. It's in the same area as the above mentioned moon.

PS. The Moon kingdom race was easy.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 07:33:47 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12648 http://curi.us/comments/show/12648
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas Tue, 04 Jun 2019 03:01:59 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12647 http://curi.us/comments/show/12647 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas Tue, 04 Jun 2019 01:45:14 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12646 http://curi.us/comments/show/12646 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
In this case, we would have two compatible theories with one of the theories saying more about the world than the other.

It's like me having one theory that says 'red helium balloons rise in the air', and another theory that says 'all helium balloons rise in the air'. Since the theories are compatible, I think the choice is yours.

If we want to predict as much as possible about the world, then we will be preferring the theory that says the most about the world.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 01:36:12 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12645 http://curi.us/comments/show/12645
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
This suggests a new and superior version of Newton's laws: it's like the old laws, except all claims about the future are replaced with "I don't know". This new version has gotten rid of an unnecessary part of the old laws. The future claims in the old laws were not useful for explaining any past observations, so we're better off without them. What do you think?]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 01:07:37 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12644 http://curi.us/comments/show/12644
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Under this definition, your floater theory is rejected because you floating person is not required for explaining any past observations.

The way I link this to induction is through the requirement for every element of a theory to have some evidential support for it to be a "good" theory.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 01:03:40 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12643 http://curi.us/comments/show/12643
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
That is what I now expected. Originally I thought your x-fall theory was an example of an e2v theory that would fit my definition of h2v, but you actually provide it as an example of a variation of Newton's gravitation.

The fault is with me. I realize now that the recent changes to my google doc has left my definition open to this criticism. I should be able to fix this soon.

More clearly, my definition should say something like: Every concept of a hard-to-vary theory is required for explaining some past observations. We cannot easily vary any of these concepts whilst still being able to account for what we want to explain.

This is still a constraint by observations, but different to the one you have been arguing against.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 01:01:00 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12642 http://curi.us/comments/show/12642
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:43:09 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12641 http://curi.us/comments/show/12641 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Can you give me an example of 2?]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:38:21 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12640 http://curi.us/comments/show/12640
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I said what I meant by a data constraint: being constrained by *not contradicting* an observation.

You haven't said what you mean.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:35:55 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12639 http://curi.us/comments/show/12639
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
1. There are infinitely many variations of Newton's laws which are *inconsistent* with past observations.

2. There are also infinitely many variations of Newton's laws which are *consistent* with past observations.

The same is true for the x-fall theory of physics:

3. There are infinitely many variations of x-fall theory which are *inconsistent* with past observations.

4. There are also infinitely many variations of x-fall theory which are *consistent* with past observations.

This is symmetric. It looked asymmetric because you picked examples from categories 1 and 4, but not 2 or 3.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:31:42 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12638 http://curi.us/comments/show/12638
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I'm not sure if you have a special definition in mind when you talk about data constraints?

What I think of as data constraints is observations. My argument is about theories being constrained by *observations*.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:31:20 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12637 http://curi.us/comments/show/12637
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
None. That is not a data constraint. It's not about data ruling out or supporting anything. It's an abstract argument saying roughly that we shouldn't make purposeless claims. The constraint imposed by that argument is a philosophical, argument-based constraint. Do you think it's an inductive argument in some way?

FYI: the more general version of that argument is that every part of our ideas should have some *problem solving purpose*. Helping us understand our observations is one type of problem to solve. There are many other problems like what are the best thinking methods or how to live morally. This extension is important because CR is a universal epistemology: it deals with non-empirical ideas too.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:24:17 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12636 http://curi.us/comments/show/12636
Anonymous Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
So varying newtons theory leads it to be inconsistent with out past observations that it is explaining, but varying your floater theory does not lead to such inconsistency.

The difference between h2v, and e2v.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:21:46 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12635 http://curi.us/comments/show/12635
Anonymous Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I thought I was still talking about data constraints.

When I say falsified, I mean "inconsistent with past observations".]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:19:01 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12634 http://curi.us/comments/show/12634
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
So my question to you is, what past observations is the "DD will float" part of you theory required for explaining?]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:17:04 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12633 http://curi.us/comments/show/12633
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
We need to resolve the current issue before switching.]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:15:37 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12632 http://curi.us/comments/show/12632
Anonymous Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
If we change Newton's inverse square law to an inverse cube law, our theory becomes falsified.

If we change DD to Kieren in the floater theory, the theory is still ok.

There is at least one element of the floater theory that can be easily varied without being falsified, so it fails my definition.

How do you account for this difference between the theories?]]>
Tue, 04 Jun 2019 00:12:20 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12631 http://curi.us/comments/show/12631
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Do you believe there is some other way that data points can constrain theories?

> " or without adding some new easy-to-vary concept to the theory".

That won't help with the problem of establishing that "DD will x-fall" *is* easy-to-vary. My point (which is also DD's position) is that that cannot be established in terms of just data constraints. That approach doesn't work. More than data is needed.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 23:57:22 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12630 http://curi.us/comments/show/12630
kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
The "DD" and the "X" of "DD will float in X circumstances" are easy to vary concepts of your floater theory. We can swap out DD for any other name, and the theory still works. So the floater theory fails my definition.

Looking over my definition in the google docs, I can see why you would offer this criticism. I think I need to be careful where I say "We cannot easily vary any of these concepts without becoming inconsistent with the evidence at hand". I should clarify and add " or without adding some new easy-to-vary concept to the theory".]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 23:46:18 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12629 http://curi.us/comments/show/12629
Anonymous Politics Discussion
![](https://curi.us/img/RqGx7lh0uHCVku0-732x339.png)

ppl r on the other side of this issue are ignorant or willfully blind.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 21:47:01 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12628 http://curi.us/comments/show/12628
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas Mon, 03 Jun 2019 21:35:25 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12627 http://curi.us/comments/show/12627 kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
I think this is important to highlight: "My definition says that EVERY concept of a good theory must be constrained by past observations."

So your example may be consistent with "every past observation", but when we examine your theory, we see at least one of its concepts is not constrained by past observation.

We have to be clear about the difference between:
1) every concept of a theory being constrained by past observation.

AND

2) A theory being consistent with every past observation.

They are not the same thing.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 21:32:40 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12626 http://curi.us/comments/show/12626
curi Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Every empirical theory is constrained by every single piece of data we have. Every data point limits what the theory can say: nothing that logically contradicts that data point.

x-falling and regular falling both are logically consistent with all empirical evidence we have. They fit with (don't contradict) *every past observation*. They were both designed with the constraint in mind of not contradicting even a single past observation.

To make further progress, one must consider other constraints that aren't merely "does it logically contradict data?". That's too limited of a constraint to do enough. There are many other constraints – any type of critical argument is an attempt to constrain ideas, and people make all sorts of arguments – but I don't want to go into them immediately because I want to focus on one issue at a time.

> We can't vary our explanation to say that people don't fall, or that they fall faster, whilst remaining consistent with our observations.

Logically, we can. There is no logical contradiction in seeing objects fall in some circumstances and saying they won't in other circumstances. To stop such claims requires something more than empirical consistency.

I think you believe data is constraining in some greater way than requiring logical non-contradiction. That's the standard inductivist view which CR denies. The basic situation is that most people find that claim intuitive but no one has ever been able to figure out detailed arguments that work (and CR has, preemptively, a bunch of reasoning about why it won't work). It's roughly the same problem as defining what observations support what theories (and how much) – the idea there is to mean something more than "logical consistency" by "support" – but what?

(This is standard CR stuff, which DD and I both believe, which is not specific to the h2v issue. The h2v idea is meant to make sense within the context of these CR beliefs, not to stand on its own without these other CR claims. So we need to start with CR in general because that's where our first disagreement is. In other words, you're disagreeing with CR premises that DD had in mind when talking about h2v.)]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 21:07:56 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12625 http://curi.us/comments/show/12625
"hard to vary" as induction kieren Rationally Resolving Conflicts of Ideas
Thanks for having a look at my argument. Here is a response.

You are right that logical consistency can also be considered a constraint on our theories, but that is of limited use in constraining claims about the world outside obviously invalid theories such as "plants require some sunlight, and no sun exposure". Maybe you have other sorts of constraints in mind?

As I argue, h2v also implies that for our theories to be "good", we require evidential support for our claims. This is a much stronger claim, and is necessary for achieving DD's goal of labeling myths and prophecies as "bad".

However, you seem to reject that this requirement for evidential support is sufficient. You give the example of a bad theory, x-falling, suggesting it satisfies my definition of h2v, because it "matches evidence". I disagree, because my definition is more than just "matching evidence". My definition says that every concept of a good theory must be constrained by past observations. The claim that people fall in general is well constrained by past observation. We can't vary our explanation to say that people don't fall, or that they fall faster, whilst remaining consistent with our observations.

However, that one particular individual is going to float on a certain date is not constrained by past observation. We can vary the date, or the name of the individual endlessly, whilst remaining consistent with past observation. We can't do the same for any concept involved in Newton's gravitation. Hence x-fall is e2v and Newton's gravitation is h2v.

To summarize. Just because a theory is consistent with the evidence at hand, doesn't mean all of its concepts are constrained by past observation. So I think the problem with your criticism is that you didn't get my definition of h2v correct.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 19:59:16 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12624 http://curi.us/comments/show/12624
curi Open Discussion
If you can't do it, well, I guess you really better learn the *philosophical skills* involved. Otherwise your life will be a mess.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 18:26:04 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12623 http://curi.us/comments/show/12623
NASA mission planning Alisa Open Discussion
> Charles Kohlhase served as Mission Design Manager for Voyager from 1974 to 1989... Following Voyager, he was science and mission design manager for the Cassini/Huygens mission to Saturn and Titan.

Kohlhase said:

> "It was my job to come up with the master plan. It was the job, essentially, of mission architect, sort of like a glorified tour planner. Basically, I had to take the scientific objectives and then build a mission around them, considering everything and taking in all aspects, from the launch vehicle to scientific instruments, the scientists' goals, how we would use gravity assist, and so on -- and then determine what requirements every element places on the others."

It's effective to have someone responsible for planning things and taking all relevant knowledge and objectives into account. It would be good to take that approach to planning your life.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 17:57:05 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12622 http://curi.us/comments/show/12622
Race in Bowser kingdom GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I didn't die at all, even though there were plenty of opportunities to die. On my first run I just followed the other characters to see where they went. On my second run, I got 2nd place. On my 3rd run, I got 1st place for the regular cup. On my 4th run, I got 1st place for the master cup.

I had less trouble with this race than any other race so far.

I used a lot of arial cap jumps. Many parts of the race involved going down from above while also requiring that you cover some horizontal distance too. These were ideal situations for arial cap jumps.

PS. 7 moons left to get in this kingdom.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 16:15:58 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12621 http://curi.us/comments/show/12621
Getting more moons without tutorials/videos GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
I got 3 more moons in the luncheon kingdom, leaving only 2 to get: the secret path to the volcano (moon 47) and the hint art (49).

I went to the Ruined kingdom and got a few moons, leaving 3 left to get. I have no more leads. I got all the hints from the Hint Toad. There is no parrot like in the other kingdoms.

I went to the Bowser kingdom. I've gotten a bunch of moons so far. I also got a moon for the Seaside kingdom. I found a painting portal that took me to that kingdom. I got moon 49, secret to seaside kingdom.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 12:17:35 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12620 http://curi.us/comments/show/12620
Anonymous Open Discussion
> Even apparently negative stories, for example about how hard the workers are driven, benefit Amazon, much like a mobster's reputation: 'don't try competing with these guys'.

Short, interesting article. The basic point is stories like "amazon treats its business partners harshly (third party sellers)" and "amazon treats its warehouses employees harshly in giant, super-organized warehouses where amazon insists on efficiency" fit the narrative that amazon gets good deals for customers and is hard to compete with.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 11:55:22 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12619 http://curi.us/comments/show/12619
Anonymous Fear of Future Employers
https://www.reddit.com/r/Competitiveoverwatch/comments/bwbzzf/you_cant_say_that_stuff_a_blizzard_employee/

Excerpt:

> “But anyway it wasn’t overly bad, it was just one thing in one video, and I got a message basically saying ‘I saw you say that thing in that video and if you want any future in esports or the industry with Blizzard titles, you can’t say that stuff’. And that really messed with me. That really messed with me, I was really torn by that because I wasn’t even saying anything bad, I was the most positive channel, at least I tried to be the most positive Overwatch channel in all of Youtube and actually I think I achieved it, I thought that overall all my videos were more level-headed and more positive and just, I tried to look at the good side of things where a lot of other channels would be very negative about things. So I was just sort of shocked that they would pick this one thing, the one time I ever said anything bad and say ‘Oh you can’t say that or else we’re gonna basically blacklist you…’ that really really messed with me. And that’s actually also when my posting schedule got a little more erratic, because like I said I was just sort of disturbed by it, some of my videos were kinda weird honestly, I don’t really like my last 5 videos, maybe more, I thought they were a bit weird and not really my voice because again I was sorta torn between trying to be the voice that the industry wanted me to be, if I ever wanted to have a job, or to be honest, and it wound up being some sort of weird in-between that I just didn’t like. And that’s inevitably why I took a break…”

After working in 5+ different esports job roles in the last year+, skyline is back and feels less need to pander cuz now he has insider perspective on industry that he wanted, so he can be more confident about his claims about gaming stuff.]]>
Mon, 03 Jun 2019 11:17:10 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12618 http://curi.us/comments/show/12618
Neat tweet about SNS5 winner Frisco Open Discussion Mon, 03 Jun 2019 08:57:00 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12617 http://curi.us/comments/show/12617 Getting better GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
regarding my ability to control the Mario character...

I'm much better.

The races are getting easier.

I almost never fail doing arial cap jumps now and I had tons of trouble with it before. I did many sessions focussed on practicing arial cap jumps.

I can now do wall jumps followed by arial cap jumps, allowing me to get on top of a plateau. (Later I'll need to precede the wall jump with an arial cap jump to cross a big distance.)]]>
Sun, 02 Jun 2019 17:07:56 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12616 http://curi.us/comments/show/12616
Anonymous Philosophy Side Quests
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0cMiSSCPbZk

video about a speedrunner supposedly dreaming a world record run of someone else, in detail, before he knew it happened or saw the video if it.]]>
Sun, 02 Jun 2019 16:43:11 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12615 http://curi.us/comments/show/12615
Getting better at the game GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
Yes. A lot. See my previous post about one thing I got better at (#12613). btw I wrote that before seeing your message.

One change in me is this. Now when I go to a kingdom to get all the moons, I start by exploring everywhere on the map (while getting some moons that I notice along the way), mainly just to explore the map. I want to have a good idea of where everything is, where things are in relation to other things, how I can move from one points of the map to another. Before, I did not explore much.

So I do the exploration phase and then get all the moons I can, save a few that I have no leads on, before doing the koopa races. I've noticed that the races are easier when I already have a very good idea of how to move around the map. An example of this happened while doing the Luncheon race, which I posted about above (#12609). I used a short cut but I didn't know it was a shortcut. It was just the way I knew how to go because of my earlier exploration of the map.]]>
Sun, 02 Jun 2019 16:24:04 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12614 http://curi.us/comments/show/12614
I noticed a methodology change in me GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
today I was trying to get a particular moon and I kept dying at a particular point along the path. I remember thinking "if I die one more time, I'll move on to something else". but I didn't want to do that again. that's what I did a lot in the beginning of playing this game. I'd give up getting a particular moon to move on to getting other moons, planning to come back it later. But this time (this is not the first, but it is new compared to how I was playing the game initially), instead of quitting and moving on to other moons, I decided, "I'll keep trying until I get it.. no giving up." I thought that doing it now is better than doing it later because right now my memory of the pathway to the particular moon is best (later I'll forget some stuff). (I also thought that I should practice repeatedly trying instead of giving up.) And then 1 more try later, I got the moon. So if I had done in this case what I was doing before, I wouldn't have gotten the moon (even though just 1 more try would have gotten it).]]>
Sun, 02 Jun 2019 16:09:02 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12613 http://curi.us/comments/show/12613
curi Mario Odyssey Discussion Sun, 02 Jun 2019 16:04:51 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12612 http://curi.us/comments/show/12612 Question about OP GISTE Mario Odyssey Discussion
why is "uses motion controls some" a downside?]]>
Sun, 02 Jun 2019 15:55:24 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12611 http://curi.us/comments/show/12611
Anonymous Mario Odyssey Discussion
It seems like you're improving compared to when you started playing.]]>
Sun, 02 Jun 2019 15:53:30 +0000 http://curi.us/comments/show/12610 http://curi.us/comments/show/12610