Topic: preagreement of definitions required for productive discussion?

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https://discord.com/channels/267657819888754688/267659413697851392/663811...

Note: Quotations are selective, not complete. Messages may be grouped together if they appear to have a common theme/ idea, even if they were separated by other messages in the Discord chat. Quotes may be indicated by a "-" here when they were indicated some other way in the original chat. Some notes are my summaries. I'm interested in feedback (alternative interpretations and criticism of my interpretations).

FI's approach, e.g. re it's view on knowledge, is mired in language games. I worry that it attempts to obfuscate the lack of clear analysis that I expect.

GISTE: you could explain a mistake in something and i can try to address it. that could lead to me or you or both maybe changing our mind. if you'd rather not do that, what do you propose instead? how about you tell me your view of knowledge?

VSE: We are using entirely foreign semantics. The meaning of words as I understand them is radically different from your understanding.
We are, in effect, speaking different languages.
So without clarifying semantics, there is no way to have a productive conversation. And I'm not very interested in doing semantics in that sense. I don't want to define words that I consider to be remedial.

are you saying that without agreeing on the definitions of words (which words specifically?), we can't have a productive discussion about ideas like about what knowledge isn't

Right. We should have agreed-upon meanings like knowledge, justification, evidence, faith, reasons, logic, rationality, conclusions, theory, proof, refute, rebut, belief, reliable, just to name a few. I'm not interested in conversations where people don't have a sufficient enough understanding of philosophical literature and the associated terminology to discuss substantive concepts.

no i guess the word "knowledge" is one of the words that you consider to be fairly remedial. Right?

No, I think what it is that confounds knowledge is challenging beyond a clear analysis of it. E.g. JTB: Knowledge is justified, true, belief. Or Reliabilism - knowledge is a true belief that is formed using reliable processes. Notably, such analyses are predicated on a clear understanding of the terms which the analysis relies upon, "truth", "justification", "belief", etc.
I am skeptical that if I bring up the problem of internalism/ externalism here that it will be a productive discussion in this server. I get the sense that there is little engagement with epistemology beyond the narrow view espoused.
Or if I need to talk about theoretical virtues, or maybe pragmatic considerations, or doxastic attitudes affect beliefs, whether or not normativity in beliefs is transitive, or a myriad of other concerns that might play into analyzing what knowledge is or demands.

So you learned what "faith" means from "philosophical literature"? In your view, how are those people who who the "philosophical literature" learn what "faith" means?

The meaning of "faith" is it's semantic content, the semantic content of a word, or what the word refers to, is a product of a certain causal relationship which is subsequently maintained by a linguistic community comprised of competent speakers of a language.

I'm not sure you're understanding my question. It could be because I don't understand your perspective or you don't understand mine or both. I'm not sure what I mean hopes that we bridge this communication gap. how did the people who wrote the philosophical literature find out what is the semantic content of the word "faith"?

By examining the causal relationship and its maintenance by a linguistic community

no is there ever disagreement between members of a linguistic community about what the word "faith" means?

That is how multiple senses of a word arise

are all the senses of a word equally valid? Or are some of the senses of a word get rejected as wrong?

The overwhelming consensus in linguistics and the philosophy of language is that to say a word usage "wrong" is to convey a linguistic error language. Assuming that the terms "right" and "wrong" definitions is to espouse linguistic essentialism. Linguistic essentialism holds that words have set, concrete, or essential meanings. That view seems to be false, and it seems to be incompatible with externalist accounts of semantics; those accounts where the meaning of the words is external to ones mind. (Wittgenstein's Beetle-in-a-box thought experiment is a good example of reason to reject linguistic essentialism.)
Thus, if we are to believe the overwhelming consensus of experts, if the field of reasoning is sound, there are no "right" and "wrong" uses of words.
If I use the word "water" but actually mean "oxi" I'm not using the word incorrectly, rather I'm using it exoterically or unusually. If my goal is to facilitate clear communication it would behoove me to either define my use of the word "water" or use the word "oxi" as it is more commonly accepted to pick out the concept (i.e. the referent of "oxi").

is there ever a situation like this? two members of the linguistic community disagree about the definition of a word, and then after some discussion, one or both of them change their mind such that they now agree and now they share the same sense of that word.

Yes, that is engaging in semantics.

so your position is that you and I can't have a productive discussion about what knowledge is because we don't have pre-agreement on the definitions of some words like "Knowledge, justification, evidence, faith, reasons, logic, rationality, conclusions, theory, proof, refute, rebut, belief, reliable," and others?

Notably, I spent some time here trying that strategy to construct a mutually agreed-upon definition as an "incomplete argument". I send to learn from example and have no need to repeat a strategy that has been shown to be unwelcome.

Your analysis of the situation seems right.

If you and I had pre-agreement on the definition of the word "knowledge" we would not have the point of discussing what knowledge is, given that we already agree about it!

We could agree on constituent components.

The adherent to JTB and the adherent to reliabilism disagree what constitutes knowledge. The adherent to JTB holds that knowledge must be justified where the reliabilist holds that knowledge is constituted by true beliefs by being the product of a a reliable process.

So you see these two questions as equal? (1) What does "knowledge constitute"? (2) What is knowledge?

For example, both the JTBist and the reliabilist agree that knowledge isn't a subset of belief, that knowledge is a belief and all that entails (such as being normative). They disagree about what constitutes knowledge. The JTBist holds that knowledge must be justified where the reliabilist holds that knowledge is constituted by true beliefs by being the product of a a reliable process.

What is your view on these questions? (1) What does "knowledge constitute"? and (2) What is knowledge?

Is answer those questions independently of the definitions of several of the other words I gave earlier.

I see what you mean. I have a question about the distinction between 1 and 2. I'm having trouble mapping which answer goes with which question. Can you clarify which (1) is what I'm asking based on the structure of your paragraph (it doesn't make sense to me)

(A) this... "knowledge isn't a subset of belief" is an answer to the question "what is knowledge?"

(B) and this... "knowledge must be justified" and "knowledge is distinguished from beliefs by being the product of a a reliable process" are distinct answers to the question "What does knowledge constitute?"

In the context of propositional knowledge (A) is one way we might answer the question, "What is knowledge?" To expand on that further we might say that knowledge (A) knowledge is a belief that P, which is true, attitude that P is the case, and that P is the case".

An analysis of "knowledge", which will include what constitutes knowledge, will depend on elements from (A). Therefore, we might ask "If knowledge is a belief then what is the difference between S knows that P and S believes that P?". (B) offers a way of answering that question.

To continue the concrete example of the JTBist and the reliabilist agree that
1) Knowledge is a belief that P, which is an attitude that P is the case, and that P is the case

They will disagree on what constitutes knowledge and thus what distinguishes knowledge from a belief. For the JTBist knowledge is distinguished from belief by justification. For the reliabilist knowledge is distinguished from belief by being the product of a reliable process. (Note: these views do not exhaust the field - they are some of the most common accounts)

can you demonstrate a real world example of how to judge scientific theories, how new scientific theories are created and how they refute old scientific theories, etc etc. using your understanding of knowledge?

NO REPLY YET