I know some bad things about Murray Rothbard (like his view that abortion is justified by the property rights of the mother against a trespasser, his belief that children are property and that parents are not obligated to feed their children, his attack on Objectivism, and his anti-semitism). But I've seen some merit in his work on economics, and I've begun reading his book An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. I mostly like it so far, but one must be careful not to trust everything. A particularly interesting part, to me, was the discussion of Aristotle, which I thought was good. It was a lot like what Objectivists say about Aristotle. I don't know how much this is because of Rothbard's knowledge of Objectivism, and how much it's a standard non-Objectivist view. Reading about Aristotle on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Encyclopaedia Britannica, or Wikipedia is rather different than the Objectivist or Rothbardian interpretation. I tried to google for material on Aristotle similar to the Objectivist view, and found this page ... but I checked and the authors are Objectivists.
Here are some new Rothbard errors I've discovered (italics in quotes are added by me, unless noted):
The continual progress, onward-and-upward approach was demolished for me, and should have been for everyone, by Thomas Kuhn's famed Structure of Scientific Revolutions.[5] [italics in original]
See the replies to Kuhn by Karl Popper and by David Deutsch. (Deutsch's writing on this subject is more accessible and more general, so it's what I'd recommend first if you're interested.)
Related to Kuhn (a critic of Popper) is Rothbard's completely false hostility to Popper in The Present State of Austrian Economics:
For my purposes, I am ignoring the allegedly wide gulf between the earlier positivists with their “verifiability” criterion and the Popperites and their emphasis on “falsifiability.” For those far outside the logical empiricist camp, this dispute has more of the appearance of a family feud than of a fundamental split in epistemology. The only point of interest here is that the Popperites are more nihilistic and therefore even less satisfactory than the original positivists, who at least are allowed to “verify” rather than merely “not falsify.”
Popper is not a positivist, nor similar to one. This is totally ignorant, yet he writes about it professionally (rather than being aware of his ignorance and leaving this matter to others).
Going back to An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, I searched it for discussion of Godwin and Burke, who are thinkers where I could readily judge the quality of Rothbard's work, offhand, from my own expertise. Burke isn't mentioned at all, which is an error in a detailed book which gives attention to many lesser known figures. (Burke is fairly well known in general, but not for his comments on economics, even though he made many of them.) Rothbard did very extensive research for this book, but somehow omitted Burke. An example of Burke's relevance, from an 1800 biography of Burke, which has been quoted in many more recent books:
[Adam] Smith, [Burke] said, told him, after they had conversed on subjects of political economy, that he was the only man, who, without communication, thought on these topics exactly as he did.
Adam Smith is a major focus of Rothbard's attention, so Burke was worth discussing at least a little.
Rothbard's treatment of Godwin was much worse. He brings up Godwin briefly in relation to Malthus and makes egregious errors:
In his Utopian belief in the perfectibility of man
The "perfectibility" of man is not a Utopian belief, it means that man can be improved without limit (without reaching an end to progress), not that man can or will reach perfection. The improvement includes both improvement of ideas and of technology. This is a major theme of Deutsch's The Beginning of Infinity, which is titled for this theme and includes Godwin in the bibliography.
William Godwin, on the other hand, was the world's first anarcho-communist, or rather, voluntary anarcho-communist. For Godwin, while a bitter critic of the coercive state, was an equally hostile critic of private property.
That's just not what Godwin says in his material on property in Political Justice.
Godwin believed, not that private property should be expropriated by force, but that individuals, fully using their reason, should voluntarily and altruistically divest themselves of all private property to any passer-by.
Rothbard doesn't provide any quote or citation for this false claim. I will, nevertheless, offer some quotes from Political Justice to refute it, from book 8 (of 8), Of Property.
Of property there are three degrees.
The first and simplest degree is that of my permanent right in those things the use of which being attributed to me, a greater sum of benefit or pleasure will result than could have arisen from their being otherwise appropriated. It is of no consequence, in this case, how I came into possession of them, the only necessary conditions being their superior usefulness to me, and that my title to them is such as is generally acquiesced in by the community in which I live. Every man is unjust who conducts himself in such a manner respecting these things as to infringe, in any degree, upon my power of using them, at the time when the using them will be of real importance to me.
It has already appeared[1] that one of the most essential of the rights of man is my right to the forbearance of others; not merely that they shall refrain from every thing that may, by direct consequence, affect my life, or the possession of my powers, but that they shall refrain from usurping upon my understanding, and shall leave me a certain equal sphere for the exercise of my private judgement. This is necessary because it is possible for them to be wrong, as well as for me to be so, because the exercise of the understanding is essential to the improvement of man, and because the pain and interruption I suffer are as real, when they infringe, in my conception only, upon what is of importance to me, as if the infringement had been, in the utmost degree, palpable. Hence it follows that no man may, in ordinary cases, make use of my apartment, furniture or garments, or of my food, in the way of barter or loan, without having first obtained my consent.
The second degree of property is the empire to which every man is entitled over the produce of his own industry, even that part of it the use of which ought not to be appropriated to himself.
Godwin didn't think people should give away their property to random people, he thought they should have property rights but sometimes, due to rational argument, give some property, as a gift, to someone who had a better use for it. I think trade should be emphasized over gifts and that Godwin wasn't a great economist, but Godwin did support private property and the free market, and was an individualist.
It is not easy to say whether misery or absurdity would be most conspicuous in a plan which should invite every man to seize upon everything he conceived himself to want.... We have already shown,[3] and shall have occasion to show more at large,[4] how pernicious the consequences would be if government were to take the whole permanently into their hands, and dispense to every man his daily bread.
Note the anti-communism.
The idea of property, or permanent empire, in those things which ought to be applied to our personal use, and still more in the produce of our industry, unavoidably suggests the idea of some species of law or practice by which it is guaranteed. Without this, property could not exist. Yet we have endeavoured to show that the maintenance of these two kinds of property is highly beneficial.
Godwin supports the protection of property.
For, let it be observed that, not only no well informed community will interfere with the quantity of any man's industry, or the disposal of its produce, but the members of every such well informed community will exert themselves to turn aside the purpose of any man who shall be inclined, to dictate to, or restrain, his neighbour in this respect.
No one should interfere with anyone's property rights, and people who try to should be stopped.
The most destructive of all excesses is that where one man shall dictate to another, or undertake to compel him to do, or refrain from doing, anything (except, as was before stated, in cases of the most indispensable urgency) otherwise than with his own consent. Hence it follows that the distribution of wealth in every community must be left to depend upon the sentiments of the individuals of that community.
What more does Rothbard want from property rights than that men use their minds in order to use their property in the way they see fit? If Godwin had his way, the result would be a capitalist dream, not a communist society.
But, if reason prove insufficient for this fundamental purpose, other means must doubtless be employed.[9] It is better that one man should suffer than that the community should be destroyed. General security is one of those indispensable preliminaries without which nothing, good or excellent can be accomplished. It is therefore right that property, with all its inequalities, such as it is sanctioned by the general sense of the members of any state, and so long as that sanction continues unvaried should be defended, if need be, by means of coercion.
Godwin, an early anarchist of sorts, who hated violence, was still willing to recommend that the government use violence in defense of property rights, even for unjust types of property that were in existence at the time (think of feudalism and serfdom kinda stuff), let alone for property rights to the product of one's industry.
The arguments however that may be offered, in favour of the protection given to inheritance and testamentary bequest, are more forcible than might at first be imagined.
Godwin defends inheritance of property, too.
The first idea of property then is a deduction from the right of private judgement; the first object of government is the preservation of this right. Without permitting to every man, to a considerable degree, the exercise of his own discretion, there can be no independence, no improvement, no virtue and no happiness. This is a privilege in the highest degree sacred; for its maintenance, no exertions and sacrifices can be too great. Thus deep is the foundation of the doctrine of property. It is, in the last resort, the palladium of all that ought to be dear to us, and must never be approached but with awe and veneration.
The view of property as being implied from the right of private judgment is the best and most correct view of the matter. Godwin is a great liberal thinker, who Rothbard doesn't appreciate. Godwin is, in this respect, more (classical) liberal than Rothbard, and closer to Objectivism which also emphasizes reason in its defense of man's rights. (Objectivism says men have one fundamental right, the right to life, and this implies "the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being". Property rights are the implementation of this.)
And let me repeat what that last sentence says, in more modern words (palladium means source of protection, safety or preservation): Property rights should always be approached with awe and veneration, because property rights are what protect everything good. Rothbard majorly failed at scholarship.
[Godwin] was, after all, not a scholar of population theory, and he had no immediately effective reply. It took Godwin all of two decades to study the problem thoroughly and come to an effective refutation of his nemesis. In On Population (1820), Godwin came to the cogent and sensible conclusion that population growth is not a bogey, because over the decades the food supply would increase and the birth rate would fall. Science and technology, along with rational limitation of birth, would solve the problem. ["On Population" is in italics in the original]
This falsehood about Godwin needing 20 years to figure out a reply to Malthus is refuted in Godwin's book, Of Population (Rothbard got the title wrong), in the preface:
I believed, that the Essay on Population, like other erroneous and exaggerated representations of things, would soon find its own level.
In this I have been hitherto disappointed. ... Finding therefore, that whatever arguments have been produced against it by others, it still holds on its prosperous career, and has not long since appeared in the impressive array of a Fifth Edition, I cannot be contented to go out of the world, without attempting to put into a permanent form what has occurred to me on the subject. I was sometimes idle enough to suppose, that I had done my part, in producing the book that had given occasion to Mr. Malthus's Essay, and that I might safely leave the comparatively easy task, as it seemed, of demolishing the "Principle of Population," to some one of the men who have risen to maturity since I produced my most considerable performance. But I can refrain no longer. "I will also answer my part; I likewise will shew my opinion: for I am full of matter; and the spirit within me constraineth me."
Godwin didn't reply immediately because he thought he'd done enough by writing Political Justice, and that someone else could handle the much easier task of refuting Malthus' bad ideas. This had nothing to do with Godwin needing 20 years of thought or research. Godwin underestimated how influential Malthus would turn out to be, and overestimated the ability of other thinkers to address the issue.
I will keep reading Rothbard anyway. I don't think there's a superior alternative, and I do think he's better about other thinkers that he researched more, especially when their focus is more on economics (Rothbard doesn't adquately understand Godwin's thinking about reason).
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And if you can only falsify experience or evidence, it only means we might or not be able to verify OR prove dark matter
How do you falsify it though?
You would have an easier metaphysical argument claiming atomism is falsifiable
Ofc since that has NO BEARING on DARK MATTER,
It really isnt falsificationism as applies to EVERYTHING
It is VERIFICATION
But falsification implies ockhams razor
Not everything has a covariable or alternative, incompatible explanation
Hickams dictum does not explain causality because causality implies cause and effect
A specific effect
However, it does still invalidate ockhams razor if we recall not only can illnesses be comorbid (or yes, falsifiable symptoms),
But a symptom be contributed by 2 illnesses which DO HAVE THE SAME biological chemical AAAND somatic anatomatical etc pathways, pathologies, result
Psychosis for instance. Or bipolar depression as opposed unipolar even in people without bipolar
You could argue dsm is not science but a reflection of clinical summed traits
True. But there are also different mutations, even with the same proteins or nucleotides, chromosomal abnormalities or alleles. Many mental illnesses share this. Many then inside spectra, subtypes
Classical autism shares the same causes as AS. But they ALSO DIFFER in MUTATION. As well symptoms, NOT SEVERITY
Parkinsons too
But we do know this. Whether it is conclusive we know WHICH for SURE
Is a matter of conclusivity. Not lack of provability
It might be unprovable whether we can ever prove it aka also prove provability
But it is definitely provable insofar as we have the data necessary. What we lack is the replicability
But replicability is an integrity issue
In newton it was not replicability since he never tested outter space
Unless we cant test, the only inductive issue is stuff like whether any pinpointed gene is alone enough to cause this
Or whether it is the ONLY sum of mutations that cause it
Might be, AS arises from these 2 mutations
But also a totally separate 2
Other hand, it is still provable, where multiple mutations occur being we have POLYGENOMIC TOOLS
Yes yes nucleotides not genomes but bear with me
Neutral theory was falsifiable
Because it was bullsh-t
But polygenomic assessment makes it easier
Whether we know where the allele originated, is ofc open to finding older corpses or an issue of dating degrading the sample
It is also not relevant to note this, alleles, wont solve mutation
Why? Mutations dont last more than at most 2 generations and those that do without new emergence only deplete as much they accumulate
If i go back 5 generations, and average assume fecundity for birth order even irrespective a btw proven not hypergamic rate, it is still maybe i share 0.0001% of the same mutations
In addition to new 1s
Yet others which arent eeeeven mutations but actual hard inheritance, say my great great aunt who had auburn hair,
That is deleted too. We can prove that if not by the way dominant or recessives work in now multiple generations passed, by dna test
It might be falsifiable the gene that causes it is the only 1 but dating is not an issue, save for imperfectness, embalment (not that i would desecrate a grave) so if you know which 1 that caused it she had,
It is ...verifiable, no other allele would matter if i had any other too
Besides genetic incompatibility -- this is provable upon discovery
I am not suggesting this gene was incompatible with any other. Im just noting a general point here
Unless i applied my great great aunt or myself to all auburn descendants or assumed my ggm lacks it (unlike my gggm), i am pretty safe to confirm
Because i can only be incorrect in my claim if i overextend my claim
But a claim can be specific. That is not a nothing
I know this isnt quite probably useful to many here but maybe it is interesting
https://www.criticalrationalism.net/2018/12/01/critical-rationalism-and-the-critique-of-constructivist-rationalism/
It is worth noting irony, *popper mentored hayek*
Yes. I dont like hayek. But they werent like enemies. To the contrary, at least in teaching anyway as well friendlier than with rothbard hayek ever had after the years went by (which is ofc tragic, being friendship shouldnt be held hostage but being kicked from cato by koch, i guess understandable he would be envious, hayek a 2nd rate mind much as keynes also 2nd rate got popular...though the latter, he only it is said, cackled over & even mises had a fallingout, sweet guy too, with schumpeter)
The snark wasnt directed at anybody here to clarify, earlier
It was a snark at dead guys
Here is a less primary source
https://books.google.com/books?id=3VtHcYGp2pIC&lpg=PA47&pg=PA480
You seem to come from that angle too
Reason is sociopolitical but not economical to you?
The thing is, outside of scientism, the political economy is the economy & economics is a sociology
So either scientific methodology is applied to science or everything social, cultural AND economical is reason based
But reason based in that it is human reason
If it isnt the cognition nor the axiom, isnt EVERYTHING not directly empirical a reason exercise?
Regardless what 1 thinks of economics being a sociology, it is still political
If politics is reason based, i just fail to see how those are separate
Bounded rationality isnt something needed nor math
Math can do monetary or marketing can be bounded
Ayn wasnt focused on economics but there is a reason it is directly relevant to it
This is why polanyi worked on embedment or weber, industrialization
All of it is reason. Economics is simply a specialization whereas ayn generalized it in an ideal, than a description
Whatever profession popper was or wasnt, rothbard was or wasnt,
You might be surprised to learn i consider myself a political sociologist 1st, an economist 2nd
Not 1st. So perhaps it is less to do with viewpoint. Somebody can come to a different conclusion even being only secondarily an economist
So i am reading https://gordianknot.homestead.com/WritingsonMises/FallibleApriorism.html
And i see where the disagreement begins
http://www.quebecoislibre.org/04/040415-12.htm
Which i sensed from how Rafe words it, he is hinting at the Weiser controversy
Surely enough, i googled it
http://gordianknot.homestead.com/RC_PopperPaper.html
Mises broke from Weiser on more than only 1 thing. Menger's arguments were only part of that
Weiser actually influenced Hayek more. I mentioned Laske+Polanyi
Polanyi worked with and influenced him even MORESO than weiser EVER DID
Laske's ideas are similar to Kuhn's but applied to sociology
Culturalism i mentioned, remember? Even the neurohayekians cite Kuhn
Only certain hermueneticists actually even cover this. The road to postmodernism is 1
This is then where it boils down to Husserl v Simmel primarly in part later on
Sorry, this is a better source
http://public.econ.duke.edu/~bjc18/docs/A%20skirmish%20in%20the%20Popper%20Wars.pdf
Ever read these 2 dudes?
https://mises.org/wire/richard-von-strigl-subjective-value
https://mises.org/library/frank-fetter-chapter-17-desires-choice-and-value
What about Lachmann?
Luckman, THATS the other name, other than Laske
Thank you for all the interesting links. I have been going through a lot of them using curi's suggestion of the dream reader app. It works great and I can get through a lot more content faster without sacrificing comprehension.
However, I fear that as someone who doesn't have a basic understanding of the various topics you are presenting, that I am building a library from sheets of papers here and there. Instead of books.
Any suggestions for a beginner?
On epistemology / logic or economics?
Ive linked popper's logic of discovery up there as have I Gordon on austrian methodology
So...
Espistemology, i have not linked?
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by Hume
Truths and meanings by Davidson (not an endorsement FTR)
Truth and moral sciences by Putnam (also not an endorsement)
Charles Pierce, it is best if you just get his collected papers. That is, besides, where the gold is -- personally, i hate neopragmatism but he is a MUST READ for EPISTEMOLOGY
[even BEFORE putnam or davidson, personally i hate most of all both but it gives background to the debate]
---
I assume you're familiar Human Action by Mises, but i have also already linked that too
Atlas shrugged isnt as important here imho. It is possibly unimportant atm at all
Sorry, 17316 is me
I also assume you have read Kant?
Understanding and Explanation is a fascinating read by Apel
At least only if you bother getting to it
And fatal conceit by hayek - AGAIN NOT AN ENDORSEMENT, i am ONLY giving background subjects
> Thank you [Oi] for all the interesting links. I have been going through a lot of them using curi's suggestion of the dream reader app. It works great and I can get through a lot more content faster without sacrificing comprehension.
> However, I fear that as someone who doesn't have a basic understanding of the various topics you are presenting, that I am building a library from sheets of papers here and there. Instead of books.
> Any suggestions for a beginner?
That stuff is broadly not beginner appropriate. I'd suggest reading stuff from https://www.elliottemple.com/essays/reading
> Charles Pierce, it is best if you just get his collected papers. That is, besides, where the gold is -- personally, i hate neopragmatism but he is a MUST READ for EPISTEMOLOGY
Extensive discussion of Pierce stuff at http://curi.us/1595-rationally-resolving-conflicts-of-ideas (and also lots of links to stuff re my epistemology)
Depending on how far down the rabbithole you wanna go,
And i assume you have read aristotle's many works...
Nietzche: thus spoke zarathustra, truths, gay science
Schmitt: political theology (partisan myth or war writings are unimportant)
Stirner's ego and his own
Ofc anything by tocqueville
Eumeswile by junger
Anything by Davila
Anything by spengler
Weber on bureaucracy
Managerial revolution by burnham
I wont bother with duhem
Ill leave it at ONLY THAT
I streamed commentary on the prior ~50 comments.
https://youtu.be/QDLGcVMwbS8
I know it isnt beginner stuff
Thats why i left it to pierce, hume, davidson, putnam primarily
Then prefaced the next batch, "depending on how far down the rabbithole"
Ok so with pierce discussion, i guess you would be good to go, P (again hope thats ok to call you that?)
Davidson, putnam, hume might be secondary
#17323 i linked on gab, the stream
Thank you OI. Thank you curi.
#17318 I've only read Morals by Kant, none of his other works. I have read most of Plato and very little Aristotle. I've read Acton, Mills and Locke. I've read some from the Stoics. That's about as much Philosophy as I have read. Very beginner.
I've wanted to read more Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Schmitt, and Arendt. I did not find Rand to be of importance until I ran into this blog, I think I am changing my mind about that. I also want to read from the anarchists more. I don't want to just read from one point of view.